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The warfighting doctrines of NATO's five national armies, which
are deployed in central Europe against the Warsaw Pact, are examined
with emphasis on coalition warfare. NATO's warfighting doctrine is
explored with particular attention to the military and political aspects
of coalition warfare. Selected NATO command, control, and consulta-
tion issues, including synchronization and coordination, are identified
and examined. The doctrines of these five national armies are not fully
compatible. Warfighting doctrines which are not compatible increase
the vulnerability of multi-national unit boundaries and do not contrib-
ute to the overall impression of deterrence. Concepts to improve
NATO's deterrent and warfighting capabilities are presented. These
concepts include approaching incompatible national doctrines as a
coordination issue. If NATO strengthens its coordination mechanisms,
both the coalition's peacetime deterrent efforts and wartime capabili-
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the warfighting doctrines of
the national armies in NATO's Central Region. The issue will be devel-
oped in light of what may happen to NATO if it is forced to defend against
a Warsaw Pact invasion. In particular, this paper will analyze what may
occur when each of NATO's national armies, employing its diverse
warfighting doctrines, fights the Warsaw Pact.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military and
political organization. The primary goal of NATO is to maintain peace and
freedom for its members [Ref. l:p. i]. NATO pursues this goal through
two functions. The first function is to support an adequate military
strength and political solidarity to deter aggression. If deterrence fails,
NATO would defend itself and fight to restore the territory of its member
nations. The second function is to seek a stable political relationship in
which the underlying political issues can be solved. [Ref. 2:p. 2361
The 16 democratic members of NATO have formed a coalition to
achieve these two functions. The NATO alliance is fundamentally defen-
sive. NATO does not intend to initiate an invasion of the Warsaw Pact
and has structured Its forces as such and plans for a defensive conflict.
NATO is not a coalition in which one superpower dictates policy and
procedures to the other members. Additionally, the members of NATO,
each with its own unique military system, follow diverse warfighting
doctrines. The diversity in warfighting doctrines is seen in central
Europe. Within this region, NATO has eight corps deployed from five
nations. These five nations each plan to fight a Warsaw Pact invasion
with a different warfighting doctrine. [Ref. 3:pp. 321-3221
The Warsaw Pact, under the domination of the Soviet Union, is a
threat to the security of NATO's 16 members. The Soviet Union's domi-
nation of its eastern European allies appears in the make-up of the
Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact follows Soviet military thought in both
doctrine and organization. If the Warsaw Pact attacks NATO it will have
the advantage since each of its members uses a similar warfighting
doctrine [Ref. 3:p. 3291. In addition, Soviet military thinking is primarily
offensive in nature. As stated in a 1985 White Paper by the West German
government, "...Soviet military strategy is aimed at taking offensive action
and attaining military victory over NATO in the event of war." [Ref.
4:p. 451
If a conventional conflict does erupt in central Europe, many issues
will have to be faced by NATO. Will each NATO member reach its forward
defense positions in time and, Just as importantly, maintain its position,
shoulder to shoulder, with the other nations to its north and south?
Additionally, are the various national warfighting doctrines of the indi-
vidual NATO members compatible? How will possible incompatibilities in
doctrine synchronize across unit boundaries? For example, what may
happen if a West German corps, following its concept of a mobile defense
doctrine shares a common boundary with a U.S. corps employing the
maneuver based Airland Battle doctrine? If a battle fought by these two
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separate national corps using two different warfighting doctrines pro-
gresses over time, will possible opportunities for exploitation be pre-
sented to the Warsaw Pact?
B. ORGANIZATION AND SCOPE
This thesis will begin with an explanation of NATO's structure and
objectives. It explains why NATO exists and presents its unique func-
tions, with particular emphasis on the Central Region. This discussion of
the Central Region includes its geography and potential Warsaw Pact
invasion corridors. NATO's military deployments are then developed, with
an explanation of the "layer cake" arrangement of its corps and the mal-
deployment of some of its military units.
Chapter III describes the Warsaw Pact and begins with a develop-
ment of how it will fight and its organization. The offensive nature of
Warsaw Pact doctrine is stressed, with emphasis on its tenets of
surprise, combined arms offensive action, and momentum. The uncer-
tainties and vulnerabilities of the Warsaw Pact alliance are then ana-
lyzed. Finally, comments are given on the current changes the Warsaw
Pact has made in the late 1980s.
NATO's warfighting doctrine is then discussed in Chapter IV. This
chapter will define deterrence and the three levels of warfare. The 40 year
evolution of the Western Alliance is then presented with comments on
the changes in NATO doctrine. The cirent NATO doctrine of flexible
response is then explained, with emphasis on points such as follow-on
forces attack (FOFA), nuclear weapons, the flexible response triad, NATO
corps defense, and the published NATO warfighting doctrine.
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Selected aspects of NATO command, control, and consultation (C3)
are explored in Chapter V. The missions and structure of a corps are
explained. Particular emphasis is placed on issues such as military doc-
trine, synchronization, coordination between corps, combined arms
action, the coordination problem, and how is coordination achieved in
NATO. The importance of coordination and synchronization is demon-
strated by two examples. One example is the success of General George
Patton's Third Army during the Battle of the Bulge. The second example
is a discussion of possible boundary coordination problems in the Fulda
Gap, between the U.S. V Corps and the West German II Corps.
Chapter VI will present the warfighting doctrines of the national
corps in the Central Region. The various forms of defense are developed
and each national corps is discussed from this viewpoint. Following this
discussion, the five national corps are placed inside a common scenario.
The common scenario has each NATO corps defending against a Warsaw
Pact army on the North German Plain. This common scenario will assist
in demonstrating potential problems caused by diverse warfighting doc-
trines.
Chapter VII will summarize the examination of NATO's five national
warfighting doctrines. Comments are presented concerning possible solu-





The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military and
political organization. The primary objective of NATO is to maintain the
peace and freedom of its members through the support of effective deter-
rence and defense.
By the late 1940s, the Soviet Union had incarcerated nine nations
behind the iron curtain. Furthermore, the Soviet expansionism did not
show any signs of abating. For the war-weakened western nations, the
only answer seemed to be some form of collective security. In a 1949
response to the perceived Soviet threat, 12 Western countries formed a
defensive coalition. [Ref. 3 :p. 321]
The Warsaw Pact was established six years later under the control of
the Soviet Union. The Pact coordinates the security arrangements of the
eastern European member nations.
In NATO and the Warsaw Pact, one superpower dominates. The key
difference between the two coalitions is the degree of superpower control.
For example, Soviet military domination over its Pact allies has been
nearly total. In contrast, U.S. control of NATO is not absolute. American
leadership of the Western Alliance is based on the support of 15 other
peers. [Ref. 3:p. 3211
By 1990, the Western Alliance had grown to 16 nations. Although
the world situation has changed significantly since 1949, NATO is still a
5
collective grouping of nations sharing similar ideals and a common
interest.
Over the past 40 years, NATO's success in achieving its objectives
has been quite clear. For example, NATO has helped provide stability,
cohesion, and peace for the Atlantic region [Ref. 2:p. 2361. In addition,
-... the Alliance has played a major part in stopping Communist expan-
sion in Europe...." [Ref. 2:pp. 235-236] These two accomplishments will
be explained in this chapter.
The primary objective of this chapter is to examine the Western Alli-
ance. NATO's center sector will serve as the focus of this examination.
NATO's center sector is the only location where NATO and the Warsaw
Pact confront each other on a constant basis and in great numbers.
Chapter II will answer the following questions:
* What are the functions of NATO?
* How are NATO and the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR)
structured?
* How is Central Europe prepared for defense?
B. FUNCTIONS OF NATO
According to the Harmel Report of 1967, NATO has two major func-
tions. The first function is to maintain adequate military strength and
political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure. If
deterrence should fail, NATO would defend the territory of member
states. NATO's second function is. "...to pursue the search for progress
towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political
issues can be solved." [Ref. 2:p. 2361
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To examine NATO's two functions, three issues will be presented.
These issues are:
e What is deterrence?
* How is decision making accomplished in NATO?
* What actions does NATO take in an emergency?
The Western Alliance exists to deter aggression against member
nations, but what is the definition of deterrence? One definition of deter-
rence is "Steps taken to prevent opponents from initiating armed actions
and to inhibit escalation if combat occurs.. .threats of force predominate."
[Ref. 3:p. 4051 A nation or coalition establishes deterrence by having the
"forces" to deter an enemy and the "will" to use these forces. This creates
the "perception" of the deterrent strength for an opponent.
NATO decision making is affected by the fact that the coalition has
both a political and a military nature. For example, before a NATO policy
is established, both the military and political ramifications of the decision
are examined. This may explain why many NATO decisions, if questioned
from a purely military or political viewpoint, may not appear sound.
However, if analyzed from the political and military perspectives, the
NATO policy may make more sense. [Ref. 51
Even in times of extreme crisis, Alliance decision making is by com-
mon consent. In other words, all 16 members must agree before any
NATO decision is reached. Furthermore, considerable compromise may
have to take place before the decision is announced. Finally, the require-
ment for unanimous agreement creates a process which demands time
and patience. [Ref. 3:p. 323]
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The security teeth of NATO are found in Article Five of the Atlantic
Treaty. Article Five states that "...an armed attack against one or more
[members].. .shall be considered an attack against them all...," obligating
each member to take "...such action as it deems necessary, including the
use of armed force...." [Ref. 2:p. 2301 However, contrary to popular mis-
conception, NATO agreements do not require an automatic declaration of
war or any other reflex action by member nations. The only required
crisis action by NATO members, found in Article Four of the Treaty, is for
consultation. Any further response past consultation is based on the
individual nation's analysis of the nature of the attack, the defense
capabilities of the state or states attacked, who the attacker is, and any
other factors deemed important by member nations. [Ref. 3:p. 3221
As sovereign states, the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their
policies to collective decision. The Alliance affords an effective forum
and clearing house for the exchange of information and views; thus,
each Ally can decide its policy in the light of close knowledge of the
problems and objectives of the others. [Ref. 2:p. 237]
The Atlantic Treaty guarantees to each signatory that there is no
obligation to subordinate their policies to collective decision making.
As such, it must deal with the art of the possible, harmonizing the
interests of the member-states, coordinating their actions to meet a
common goal, and resolving the inevitable disputes in a manner that
leaves the alliance strong and cohesive. It should not be expected
that national governments or their representatives at NATO will rise
above their limited interests to a significant degree. Consequently,
evolutionary rather than revolutionary approaches are needed....
[Ref. 6:p. 4461
In a NATO emergency, the Atlantic Treaty stipulates the need for
consultation. The structure of NATO is designed to assist the process of
consultation.
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C. HOW NATO IS ORGANIZED
This section describes the organization of NATO. The top Alliance
leadership is composed of civilians. NATO's senior authority is the North
Atlantic Council. Permanent ambassadors from 16 coequal nations rep-
resent member governments. "The North Atlantic Council provides a
unique forum for confidential and constant intergovernmental consulta-
tion on all topics as well as providing the highest levels of decision-mak-
ing machinery within NATO." [Ref. 7:p. 7]
The Defense Planning Committee is a parallel organization whose
prime concern is formulating collective security policy. This committee
has the same membership as the North Atlantic Council, except for
France and Spain. The Defense Planning Committee also has representa-
tives from groups such as the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee and the
Nuclear Planning Group [Ref. 3:p. 323]. Figure 1 represents the NATO
Command Structure [Ref. 3:p. 324].
Chiefs of staff from NATO countries make up the Military Committee
(MC). The Military Committee advises the North Atlantic Council/Defense
Planning Committee (NAC/DPC) on security matters. Supporting the
Military Committee and the NATO structure is an International Military
Staff (IMS). [Ref. 3:p. 323]
Under the guidance of NATO leaders are three Major NATO Com-
mands (MNC). The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR),
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANI, and Allied Commander
in Chief Channel (CINCHAN) develop and coordinate military plans for
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mander in Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe, Central Europe, South-
emn Europe, and United Kingdom Air Forces [Ref. 7:p. 171.
Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT is composed of five Principal
Subordinate Commands (PSC). These Principal Subordinate Commands
defend NATO territory from the Baltic to the Alps. Allied Forces Central
Europe's Principal Subordinate Commands divide their responsibility by
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geographical region or function. The five PSCs of AFCENT are Northern
Army Groulp (NORTHAG), Central Army Group (CENTAG), Allied Air
Forces Central Europe (AAFCE), Second Allied Tactical Air Force
(TWOATAF), and Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (FOURATAF). [Ref. 7:
pp. 17-181
In peacetime, military forces remain under national control. This
NATO procedure results in a peacetime SACEUR commanding very little.
SACEUR's peacetime forces consists of 18 NATO Airborne Warning and
Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, NATO communications, and air
defenses. In addition, SACEUR has partial control over the ACE Mobile
Force. This mobile force is composed of light ground units supported by
artillery and air assets. In a crisis, national governments should execute
the timely transfer of appropriate military forces to NATO. Until this
point, NATO commanders rarely control more than their headquarters
and staffs.
American forces in Europe operate in two command structures. The
two structures are the U.S. national military command with links
through United States European Command (USEUCOM) to Washington,
D.C. and NATO's Allied Command Europe (ACE) under SACEUR.
SACEUR is dual-hatted as a NATO military commander and the senior
U.S. commander in Europe (CINCEUR). Both command structures have
similar objectives. The mission of the U.S. and NATO commands is to
provide combat-ready units to deter aggression. The main difference
exists in the area of logistics. [Ref. 8:p. 41
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ACE has the mission to plan for and employ the forces in combat;
whereas, the U.S. mission is to provide combat forces to ACE and to
support or arrange for the support of those forces should they be
employed. [Ref. 8:p. 41
D. NATO'S CENTER SECTOR
NATO's center sector is the most heavily populated and productive
part of Europe. The frontier region between NATO and Warsaw Pact is
the only location where either coalition confronts each other in large
numbers. This frontier was the high-water mark of the Red Army in
World War II and a potential start line for any future European ground
war. [Ref. 9:p. 21]
West Germany spans more than 850 kilometers from north to south.
NATO's Central Region, however, is only one-third of 850 kilometers from
east to west. In addition, the sector narrows in the center to only 225
kilometers [Ref. 10:pp. 277-278]. Two hundred and twenty-five kilome-
ters (225 km) is approximately the distance from Washington, D.C. to
Philadelphia [Ref. 3:p. 347]. Overall, a map of the center sectors portrays
a region which is long from north to south and lacking depth.
NATO's center sector lack of depth severely complicates regional
defense planning. NATO cannot slowly fall back to the Pyrenees along
established lines of communication. NATO must fight in a congested
region with little room for maneuver. [Ref. 3:p. 347]
Three strategic avenues of approach penetrate from the Warsaw Pact
into SACEUR's center sector. These three avenues are the North German
Plain, the Fulda Gap, and the Hof Corridor. Figure 2 shows these three
avenues of approach. [Ref. 9:p. 231
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Figure 2. Primary Avenues of Approach for the Warsaw Pact
The northernmost approach is the North German Plain. The North
German Plain is part of a geographic belt which starts in the Soviet
Union and extends in a broad sweep along the Baltic Sea. This belt con-
tinues westward, bending into France and ending at the Bay of Biscay
[Ref. 9:p. 21]. The North German Plain consists of flat to gently rolling
terrain. Furthermore, an excellent road system will support the move-
ments of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, a series of small
rivers and marshlands could hinder unprepared military units if they
were forced to move cross-country. [Ref. 3:p. 3441
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The North German Plain forms a natural invasion corridor and has
been utilized for that purpose by several armies. From the Warsaw Pact's
perspective, the North German Plain is extremely promising as a poten-
tial invasion route [Ref. 9:p. 221. "Traveling westward, it leads directly to
the heart of Western Europe, placing an invading army across the
enemy's industrial heartland and near every major West European capi-
tal...." [Ref. 9:p. 221 The North German Plain is also the flattest ground in
Central Europe and offers the best terrain for a Soviet-style mechanized
ground assault.
The North German Plain is of critical importance to NATO. For
example, the closeness of the North German Plain to major NATO cities
and resources makes the plain extremely valuable to NATO. In addition,
the North German Plain is required for other military uses. For example,
the U.S. supply lines, which no longer run through France, are proximate
to the North German Plain. This proximity makes the supply routes more
vulnerable to Warsaw Pact interdiction.
The flat terrain of Northern Germany makes the defender's task
increasingly more complex than that of the Warsaw Pact attacker. For
example, if the defender does not know the location of the enemy attack,
he must spread defensive forces over a larger area. The defender with
limited resources hopes that he is covering the most dangerous break-
through points. However, an open area like the North German Plain
allows the attacker to select his main effort from a wide number of
choices. In contrast, if the terrain is more restricted (as in southern Ger-
many), the attacker is constrained to fewer potential breakthrough
14
points. The attacker must overcome the difficulty of the terrain as well as
the defender's more concentrated military forces.
Movement between the northern and southern halves of NATO's cen-
ter sector is not easy. The geography of West Germany restricts the lat-
eral movement of military forces. "Not only might the forces in the south
be pinned down by enemy attacks, but the grain of the German country
tells against south-north movement by a ratio of 4:1 in hills, and 2:1 in
the plains." [Ref. 10:p. 2711 Although highways and railroads would sup-
port a peacetime redeployment, under attack it might be very difficult.
Topography is more rugged in the southern half of NATO's center
sector. Two major avenues of approach breach the mountain barriers
along the Czech and East German borders and penetrate the southern
half of the Central Region [Ref. 3:p. 3441. The first breach is the Fulda
Gap. The Fulda Gap begins in the vicinity of Weimar, East Germany,
then crosses the German border, and finally funnels into Frankfurt. TIhe
second breach is the Hof Corridor. The Hof Corridor starts near Leipzig,
East Germany, and cuts due south into Bavaria. The road net for these
two breaches is generally good. However, woods and hills hinder cross-
country movement. [Ref. 3:p. 344]
The Fulda Gap and Hof Corridor are more defensible than the North
German Plain. The terrain in southern Germany is not flat and allows the
defender major advantages if he properly prepares his defenses. Further-
more, southern Germany's more rugged terrain allows the defender the
ability to mass his forces by not having to defend every meter of the front.
This is in contrast to the flat North German Plain.
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NATO's strategic defensive posture has military advantages and dis-
advantages. Because defenders' forces can choose the tactically
advantageous terrain where they would fight, they can pick the
spots that offer them the most protection. Moreover, they can orga-
nize and coordinate their firepower to a degree unachievable by an
attacker...The disadvantage of the NATO forces' strategic defensive
posture is that a Pact aggressor would be able to select the time and
location of its attack. [Ref. 1 l:p. 31
Of the Warsaw Pact's three potential invasion corridors, the North
German Plain is the most promising to the Pact and extremely important
to NATO. Maintaining the integrity of the North German Plain is critical
for keeping NATO nations such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and West
Germany actively fighting. If NATO loses the battle for the North German
Plain, the solidarity and will of NATO will be shaken. Furthermore, the
military situation would be extremely threatening in that the Warsaw
Pact would be in the political, economic, and military core of western
Europe.
E. NATO DEPLOYMENTS
Along NATO's center sector are eight corps from five nations. Six
nations would be present if the French are counted. In time of war, these
eight corps would come under the authority of Allied Command Europe,
as discussed earlier. Because of the size of Allied Command Europe, the
region has been split in two: the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) and
Central Army Group (CENTAG) [Ref. 9:p. 401. See Figure 3 [Ref. 24:p. 201
for the military sectors in NATO's Central Region.
The northern neck of West Germany, containing the German state of
Schleswig-Holstein, is defended by a German mechanized division under
16
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Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH). AFNORTH headquarters is
near Oslo, Norway. The area of responsibility of HQ AFNORTH comprises
West Germany north of the Elbe River, Denmark, Norway, and adjacent
sea areas.
The northern neck of West Germany, containing the German state of
Schleswig-Holstein, is defended by a German mechanized division under
Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH). AFNORTH headquarters is
near Oslo, Norway. The area of responsibility of HQ AFNORTH comprises
West Germany north of the Elbe River, Denmark, Norway, and adjacent
sea areas.
The Northern Army Group is composed of four corps. From north to
south, the nationalities of these corps are: one Dutch corps south of the
Elbe River, one West German corps, one British corps in the center of the
North German Plain, and one Belgian corps covering the border with
CENTAG [Ref. 9:p. 40]. NORTHAG contains 11 divisions, but none of
these units is deployed along the inner-German border (IGB) in peace-
time. NORTHAG is responsible for approximately 210 kilometers of the
frontier with the Warsaw Pact [Ref. 10:p. 3021. In addition, in NORTHAG
the U.S. maintains one forward-deployed brigade from the U.S. III Corps.
Deploying III Corps units from the United States are scheduled to use
prepositioned equipment in NORTHAG [Ref. 9:p. 401.
The CENTAG commander also fields four corps. These four corps
cover a region of almost 590 kilometers. Two West German corps cover
the two flanks of CENTAG and two U.S. corps are in the center. A Cana-
dian brigade and a small French corps are in CENTAG's southwest
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comer. Counting the French units, there are 13 2/3 divisions in CENTAG.
[Ref. 3:p. 3441
The U.S. and German corps are close to full strength in both per-
sonnel and equipment. Furthermore, the Americans and Germans are
usually fully prepared for combat. All other NATO nations in the center
sector require about three days to achieve wartime readiness [Ref. 9:p.
401. The strengths and weaknesses of the five national armies which
make up NATO's center sector will be discussed in Chapter VI.
The vast bulk of NATO divisions are earmarked for deployment along
the inner-German border. The closest thing to a NATO reserve which is
capable of intervening in either NORTHAG or CENTAG is the II French
Corps, the small Canadian brigade, or a West German parachute divi-
sion. Furthermore, the French III Corps and the U.S. III Corps may be of
assistance in NORTHAG. [Ref. 10:p. 270]
The main grouping of Allied Command Europe's headquarters,
depots, airfields, and logistical bases is held as far west as the narrow
sector allows. The two major concentrations of these facilities are in the
vicinity of Cologne and in the region between Trier and Heidelberg. [Ref.
10:p. 270]
From north to south, the eight corps of NATO's forward defenses are:
" I Netherlands Corps
" I West German Corps
* I British Corps
* I Belgian Corps
• III West German Corps
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" V U.S. Corps
• VII U.S. Corps
" II West German Corps [Ref. 10:p. 2701
The only two corps which share common national boundaries are
the V and VII U.S. Corps. The remaining corps are intermixed. For exam-
ple, the three German corps are widely scattered among the U.S., British,
Dutch, and Belgian corps.
From a purely military viewpoint, NATO's "layer cake" corps struc-
ture is not the most effective way to defend Central Europe. The arrange-
ment of eight intermixed corps creates a complicated operational situa-
tion. For example, if the corps are deployed to their forward defensive
positions, there would be a crisis-crossing of road marches and supply
lines. One situation is the U.S. 3d Mechanized Infantry Division, whose
movement to its border sector would be through garrison areas of the
West German 12th Armored Division. IRef. 10:p. 271]
Complicating the maldeployment problem is the peacetime location
of some of the national corps. The national corps border defenses do not
always correspond to their peacetime barracks locations. For example,
the U.S. 8th Mechanized Infantry Division is poorly located on the west
side of the Rhine and at a great distance from its border positions.
Another example is that five of six brigades from the Netherlands are sta-
tioned in their homeland. Only one brigade is forward in West Germany
covering the sector assigned to the I Netherlands Corps [Ref. 3:p. 3441.
The Belgian army has a similar problem. Less than one-half of the active
armed forces are deployed forward in West Germany. Moving the Dutch
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and Belgian units into their forward positions will require early warning
of a Pact invasion [Ref. 9:p. 44]. "The time required to move Belgian and
Dutch forces to their defensive positions might well be the 'pacing factor'
that drives NATO mobilization deadlines." [Ref. 9:pp. 44-451
All nations in NATO's center sector do not possess similar military
capabilities. The detailed capabilities of individual nations will be dis-
cussed in Chapter VI. The "layer cake" arrangement has helped create
the problem of not spreading NATO forces equitably across the center
sector. For example, the important North German Plain is protected by a
mixed bag of four national corps. Many experts do not have full confi-
dence in the ability of NORTHAG (with the possible exception of the
I West German Corps) to sustain a forward defense. In contrast, the more
prepared and better equipped U.S. and German corps stand guard over
the least dangerous and the most easily defended southern sectors. [Ref.
3:p. 3441
Although it is a grave oversimplification to state outright that
NATO's right is strong and the left is weak, the fact remains that the
better going for tanks and the more important targets for the War-
saw Pact are to be found in the north, where the NATO contingents
are ill-assorted and scattered. [Ref. 10:p. 271]
From a military perspective, correcting the maldeployments of the
national corps would make military sense. However, NATO decisions are
made from both political and military points of view. The political
challenges of reshuffling are difficult [Ref. 3:p. 3471. In a commentary on
a 1975 NATO report by retired German general Ulrich de Maiziere, the
expense of reshuffling was addressed.
21
A relatively simple move, like that of a mechanized infantry battalion
to an existing base, was costed by Maiziere at 1,700,000 Deutsch-
marks at the 1975 rate. The price was much greater when a new
base had to be constructed, and amounted to 53,000,000 Deutsch-
marks for a mechanized infantry battalion- a bill which did not
include the purchase of land, or the elaborate housing and other
base facilities required by foreign regular units and their families,
like those of the Americans or British. (Ref. 10: pp. 271-2721
The much-criticized disposition of NATO forces in the Central Region
is a result of several factors. "The arrangement of the NATO forces in
West Germany owes almost everything to politics, economics, history and
inertia, and very little to operational considerations." [Ref. 10:p. 268]
In large part, the current locations of NATO's national corps parallel
post-World War II British, French, and American occupation zones [Ref.
3:p. 3441. In turn, these occupation zones were a result of allied cam-
paigns against the Germans. For example, as the allies came ashore in
Normandy on 6 June 1944, the British were on the left flank and the
Americans on the right flank. To avoid crossing lines of communications,
the British and Americans advanced across France and into Germany
with the British on the left and the U.S. forces on the right. World War II
ended with the American army campaigning in southern Germany,
Czechoslovakia, and Austria, while the British were situated in northern
Germany. The newly formed NATO alliance of 1949 generally maintained
the same defensive sectors as the post-war occupation zones. Conse-
quently, the disposition of NATO troops in 1990 is in large part a result
of a 1940s historical accident. [Ref. 10:p. 268]
There are other reasons for the mixing of the allies. One reason,
which is not stated formally, is to avoid international unease over station-
ing three or more powerful German corps in one location. In the late
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1940s and 1950s, some Europeans were unsure of massing the German
army in one location because of the history of the Franco-Prussian War,
World War I, and World War II. In addition, there is a German national
desire to defend as many sectors of their border as possible. Another
reason for the intermixing of corps is to share risk-taking. The political
advantage of sharing the risk is that a Pact invasion will not fall exclu-
sively on one nation. In other words, the Warsaw Pact assault would
engulf the forces of many nations, ideally unifying NATO action. A threat
to one nation, in one narrow sector, might not as quickly unify the
democratic nations against an invader. [Ref. 10:pp. 270-2711
Other factors contributed to the "layer cake" arrangement of the cen-
ter sector. In the late 1940s and 1950s, the financially constrained allies
were seeking barracks for their soldiers. One result of this budget prob-
lem was that the allied forces moved into whatever former Wehrmacht or
Luftwaffe barracks best suited their needs. The consequences of this
were that many units' peacetime locations were a great distance from
their wartime positions. The 1966 departure of the French military also
left large gaps in NATO defenses. Filling these holes, primarily with West
Germans, further contributed to the "layer cake" disposition of NATO
troops. [Ref. 10:p. 2681
The "layer cake" ground defense of NATO's Central Region should be
viewed as a whole. A successful defense of a national corps area means
little if a major Warsaw Pact penetration occurs elsewhere. Unfortu-
nately, mutual support between five national forces could be difficult.
This concept will be further discussed in Chapter V.
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m. THE WARSAW PACT
A. INTRODUCTION
To properly assess how the Warsaw Pact will fight the NATO alliance
is a complicated task. This chapter will portray the Warsaw Pact in a sim-
plified manner. The Pact is in the process of change and its final form is
open to debate. These changes may result in a Warsaw Pact without a
significant advantage in conventional arms. However, this chapter will
discuss only the present organization, not anticipated forces structures
[Ref. 12:p. 921. With this approach in mind, the Warsaw Pact will be
examined on the following levels: how it will fight, how is it organized,
and what the uncertainties in its structure are.
B. HOW THE WARSAW PACT WILL FIGHT
The Soviet forces and their Warsaw Pact allies are trained and
equipped for a wide variety of operations. These operations cover the
spectrum of military conflict from all-out nuclear, chemical, and biologi-
cal warfare to conventional warfighting. For whatever level of operations,
the Warsaw Pact stresses offensive action as the key tenet of their doc-
trine. From the Warsaw Pact's perspective, offensive maneuver is supe-
rior to all others. Any defensive action is looked upon only as a
temporary condition. This offensive doctrine has its roots in Soviet his-
tory. The best way to defend the Soviet Union from ground invasion is to
ensure that any war is conducted from the east to the west and not from
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the west to the east. This point was first learned from Napoleon in 1812
and relearned during Hitler's assault of 1941. [Ref. 10:p. 2501
Most western military analysts. from reading Soviet literature and
observing Soviet military operations since World War II, agree that the
form of Warsaw Pact strategy in Central Europe has become quite evi-
dent. The strategy of the Warsaw Pact is a quick penetration of NATO's
forward defenses. This break-through is followed by rapid movement into
the strategic depths of NATO. This would, in turn, hinder mobilization of
NATO's European forces and prevent reinforcements from the United
States, Britain and Canada. The successes of these operations would
then lead to the military and political collapse of the NATO alliance. [Ref.
13:p. 4]
On the ground, this strategy is accomplished by the massing of
superior forces at the point(s) of penetration. "In offensive operations,
Pact forces can be expected to concentrate along NATO's Central Front
on narrow axes of attack to break through what they consider the most
vulnerable sectors of NATO's forward defenses." [Ref. 12:p. 941 The War-
saw Pact armies will be arrayed in echelons. The first echelon forces
would fix or destroy NATO's forward defenses. The second echelon would
either reinforce success, complete the destruction of NATO's forward
units, or flow through the newly created gaps into the depths of NATO.
[Ref. 13:p. 41
If the Warsaw Pact decides to destroy NATO using a direct military
attack, the success of this assault would depend primarily on three
factors. These three factors are surprise, at both the strategic and
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tactical levels, a combined arms offensive, and combat momentum. [Ref.
14:p. 2]
C. SURPRISE
The use of surprise is a principle of war highly favored by the War-
saw Pact. This is found by the extensive coverage given the element of
surprise in their military writings, training, and operations. The Soviets'
most recent military operations in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan
demonstrated their skill at achieving strategic surprise by extensive
deception operations. [Ref. 9:p. 671
The element of surprise is a much sought-after goal. Commanders at
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels all expend great efforts to
obtain this goal. For example, tactical surprise has worked successfully
on countless battlefields where the unexpected attack has caught the
defender unaware. This has led to even greater success if the attacker is
bold enough and sufficiently prepared to exploit his new-found
advantage. [Ref. 9:p. 671
Strategic surprise Is often harder to obtain. The advent of space
satellites should make strategic surprise more difficult to achieve. Even if
harder to achieve, the results of strategic surprise are much more pro-
nounced. For example, if strategic surprise is successful, the enemy may
be removed with one decisive action. Furthermore, the goal of strategic
surprise is not necessarily to hide war preparations from the intended
defender but to place doubts in the mind of the victim concerning the
true intentions of the attacker. [Ref. 9:p. 681
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Surprise attacks in the 20th century have become the preferred
method of starting conventional wars.
The German assault on Russia, the Japanese attack on Pearl Har-
bor, the Israeli preemptive attacks of 1967, the Warsaw Pact's rapid
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the Soviet occupation of
Kabul in 1980 were all strategic surprises aimed at quickly over-
throwing the opposition; in some cases they succeeded. [Ref. 9:p. 681
D. COMBINED ARMS OFFENSIVE
The Warsaw Pact will attack in a combined arms manner. This force
will employ air power, surface-to-surface missiles, special forces opera-
tions, initial assaulting forces, and follow-on forces. Each element of the
combined arms force will be fitted into the overall plan with Its individual
set of objectives. The goal will be an effective balance of combined forces
which would have a synergistic effect on the overall operation.
This combined arms force will consist of several components. Initial
assaulting forces will seek multiple and deep penetrations of NATO's for-
ward defenses. "New generations of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles
have been introduced at rates exceeding NATO's modernization." [Ref.
14:p. 41 New self-propelled artillery units, air defense weapons, attack
helicopters, and close support aircraft have added increased firepower for
the Warsaw Pact commanders. Follow-on forces, fresh and highly mobile,
would continue the attack and seize objectives deep in NATO territory.
Furthermore, the Soviets have created "Operational Maneuver Groups"
(OMG) to3 provide additional shock and mobility for the Warsaw Pact. The
final result of these elements is a highly mobile force which is designed to
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utilize combined arms tactics and take advantage of the element of sur-
prise. [Ref. 14:p. 41
To be certain to take what you attack is to attack a place the enemy
does not protect.. .Now an army may be likened to water, for Just as
flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an
army avoids strength and strikes weakness. Sun Tzu (2:96,101) [Ref.
15:p. 101
E. MOMENTUM
The third factor of Soviet doctrine is the principle of momentum.
This is created by the "mass" of the forces combined with the "velocity or
speed" of their action. This momentum would seek to penetrate the for-
wardly deployed forces of NATO and provide the means to continue the
attack into NATO territory.
The first element of momentum is "mass." The Soviets seek a margin
of at least three or four to one at the point of attack if their assault is to
have an acceptable chance of success. However, a superiority of seven or
eight to one is hoped for to greatly increase the chances for a quick
victory. [Ref. 16:p. 1531
To move the Pact forces toward the frontline in a dispersed but use-
ful manner, the concept of "echeloning" has been developed. This concept
calls for all units, from a company upwards, to move in at least two eche-
lons. For example, in an attack, if the forward echelon is successful, the
second echelon could exploit this effort with its fresh forces. [Ref. 9:p. 64]
Seen from the front, the effect of these successive echelons would be
like waves crashing onto a beach, one after the other, preceded by a
rolling storm of artillery fire and possibly chemical attack supported
by armed helicopters and close support aircraft. [Ref. 9:p. 64]
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The second element of momentum is "speed" or "velocity." This
principle is stressed throughout all phases of a Warsaw Pact military
operation. "Rapidity of attack gains surprise, reduces the enemy's ability
to respond, and takes from the enemy time he would use against Soviet
forces." [Ref. 9:p. 62] This is demonstrated in Warsaw Pact military train-
ing, which stresses meeting engagements, pre-planned actions in
response to a battlefield situation (battle drills), and "speed of decision."
Whether or not "speed of decision" will be a reality is open to some
debate in a society which discourages initiative and risk-taking. [Ref. 9:
pp. 62-63]
The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact is standardized on the
Soviet model. This is in contrast to NATO. "The Soviet Union would never
tolerate in the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact the wild divergences that
are found in NATO." [Ref. 10:p. 1461 The warfighting doctrine of the War-
saw Pact stresses offensive action, but the ability of the non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact armies to meet all aspects of the Soviet-style offensive doc-
trine could be questioned.
F. HOW THE WARSAW PACT IS ORGANIZED
The Warsaw Pact is under the control and leadership of the Soviet
Union. The organization of each member's military force is similar to the
Soviet example.
In the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets maintain four groups: Group of
Soviet Forces, Germany; Northern Group of Forces in Poland; Central
Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia; and the Southern Group of Forces in
Hungary. The relationships between these Soviet units and NATO may be
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seen in Figure 4 [Ref. 10:p. 2691. In wartime, forces from these groups
and Soviet military districts will be organized into theaters of military
operations (Russian: TVD) and fronts (army groups). [Ref. 17 :p. 1 -11
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four motorized rifle divisions and one or two tank divisions. The tank
army has two to four tank divisions and one to two motorized rifle divi-
sions. The three types of Warsaw Pact divisions are rifle, tank, and air-
borne. These units are organized based on their mission. [Ref. 17:pp. 1-2
to 1-31
Deployed in East Germany are 19 highly trained and fully equipped
Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions. These units are supported by
five more divisions in Czechoslovakia, two in Poland, and perhaps four in
Hungary. The forwardly deployed Soviet divisions are supported by a fur-
ther 37 divisions in the western military districts of the USSR. The non-
Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) allies currently field 29 divisions and 15
brigades for use by the Pact. The overall readiness of these units does
vary between nations. Most are not fully manned, trained, or equipped.
[Ref. 12 :p. 95]
The Pact military units share a major advantage because they share
a common doctrine, equipment, and command and control system. The
current structure of the Warsaw Pact is depicted in Figure 5 [Ref. 3:p.
328). The Warsaw Pact does not have the major problem of being a
voluntary alliance of democratic nations.
.. as a voluntary alliance of sovereign and capitalist nations, NATO
does not have the will or the power to enforce the high degree of
standardisation and interoperability which obtains in the military
equipment of the Warsaw Pact. [Ref. 10:p. 1461
The Warsaw Pact is continuing a major modernization program. The
Pact is fielding new systems and replacing older models. For example, the
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T-80. T-64B and T72M1 Main Battle Tanks are a significant improvement
over current vehicles. Furthermore, one of the most serious threats to
NATO is the increased use of reactive armor by the Warsaw Pact. This
type of armor and other improvements may negate much of NATO's mod-
em antiarmor forces and antitank missile capability [Ref. 12:p. 110].
Other modernization efforts are continuing in the areas of infantry fight-
ing vehicles, artillery, and attack helicopters.
G. UNCERTAINTIES AND VULNERABILITIES
The forces of the Warsaw Pact are formidable, but the Warsaw Pact
does have problems. These problems compound the uncertainties of Pact
leaders when they are calculating the advantages and disadvantages of a
direct military assault on NATO. In a book entitled Strengthening Conven-
tional Deterrence in Europe, many of these uncertainties are noted. This
book was prepared by a special panel of NATO experts which included
General Andrew Goodpaster and General Franz-Joseph Schulze. These
experts discuss the Warsaw Pact uncertainties caused by:
" The difficulty of achieving strategic and tactical surprise in an era of
high technology sensors and other systems.
" The success of the Warsaw Pact's largely untried doctrine and
concepts.
• The capabilities for initiative and flexibility at lower levels of
command.
" The reliability of Warsaw Pact allies. This issue has only increased
after the startling changes which have taken place in the 1980s and
continue to occur in the 1990s.
" The potential for nuclear escalation. [Ref. 14:pp. 5-61
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In a direct invasion of Central Europe, other issues appear which
complicate the operations of the Warsaw Pact. These complications
include:
* The requirement for a swift victory before the mobilization of the
superior western economies and military potential.
* The dependence on a steady flow of follow-on forces.
* The dependence on roads and open terrain, which are becoming
increasingly restricted by the growing urbanization of Central
Europe.
* The Soviet tradition of executing highly preplanned and rigid military
operations.
" The need for continuous and effective command and control as the
Warsaw Pact advances into enemy territory.
" The gigantic logistical requirements of a large, combined arms oper-
ations which must be supported by reliable lines of communications.
" The requirement of massing breakthrough forces for offensive oper-
ations. These concentrations will become vulnerable to NATO con-
ventional and nuclear firepower. [Ref. 14:pp. 5-61
In addition, other critical issues are present in the minds of the
Soviet planners. Such potential problems are the loyalty of the diverse
ethnic or national groups which are present in the Soviet republics. What
will these groups do when the Soviet military is engaged in Central
Europe? Furthermore, the Chinese question is still a reality. While the
Red Army is invading Western Europe, will the Chinese remain quiet
along their long, shared border with the Soviet Union? All of these uncer-
tainties and vulnerabilities are part of the equation as the Warsaw Pact
leaders weigh the decision of invading NATO territory.
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In any study of Soviet doctrine, one may be impressed with the large
concentrations of military forces. The highly mobile and effective Soviet
armor may be easily visualized breaking through any opponent, but
Soviet military doctrine is not played out simply on a sand table or inside
a training area.
...anyone who actually ever had to maneuver armor across country
and through built-up areas knows it is not the smooth and rapid
evolution shown on the sand table. Instead there are rapid spurts
across open areas. Then there is the maneuvering through streets
and over embankments, then stream gullies and stone walls, all the
while trying to keep one's own tanks in sight and to look for those of
the enemy. Compound the scene by adding air attack, noise, smoke,
and unfriendly fire, thereby driving formations off the roads and into
the fields and forests. Visual contact would be lost, both with guid-
ing roads and with friends. Units on narrow fronts would wander
into the paths of neighboring formations. The Red Army's problems
are further increased with its reluctance to train tank crews in map
reading or land navigation. [Ref. 9:p. 1071
H. CURRENT CHANGE
Since mid-1987, the Soviets have publicly proclamed the "defensive
orientation" of their armed forces. Furthermore, their military doctrine is
stated to be based on "reasonable" or "defense sufficiency." The Soviet
leadership has explained the current force reductions as part of their
shift toward a defensive force structure. On 25 April 1989, the Soviets
began their troop withdrawal with a well-publicized ceremony in Hun-
gary. "Simultaneously, however, the Soviet Union has been reorganizing
and modernizing its general purpose forces and is pushing ahead with
research and development on new generations of weapons for those
forces." (Ref. 12:p. 59] Force reductions are beginning to take place, but
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the implications of these reductions will require careful evaluation in
future years. [Ref. 12 :p. 591
The Soviets and their allies hold a numerical advantage in conven-
tional forces. In addition, the qualitative edge held by NATO is decreasing
with the fielding of such systems as the T-80 Main Battle Tank and the
Pact's reactive armor program. Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact enjoys the
advantage of standardization in doctrine, equipment, and organization.
This doctrine stresses offensive action. NATO's doctrine is strictly defen-
sive, consequently allowing the Warsaw Pact the ability to secure the ini-
tiative and fix the time and location of their strike. However, the Soviets
and their allies do understand and appreciate the numerous uncertain-
ties of any decision to invade NATO [Ref. 12: p. 1121. The Warsaw Pact is




The Western Alliance was not formed to fight a future European war.
Instead, NATO's primary goal is to deter this war [Ref. 18 :p. 28]. In
NATO, extensive consultation takes place. Part of the consultation is for
each member to accept possible differences in the views of other mem-
bers. Military and political leaders possess opinions on how their
national armies will fight. The purpose of coalition warfare is to seek a
common doctrine which is both cohesive and coordinated. "NATO prefers
to deter peacefully the attack through the expression of alliance cohesion
and adequate strength." [Ref. 18:p. 4
Within NATO, deterrence and defense have two separate objectives.
Deterrence relates to a peacetime goal. NATO's primary objective is deter-
rence. Defense connotes a wartime goal. Warfighting, as seen in defense,
has taken a second place behind war avoidance [Ref. 18:p. 51. The two
concepts of deterrence and defense are a potential problem for NATO.
"Too often the solution to a peacetime problem initiates or compounds a
wartime problem...." [Ref. 18:p. 51 One example is the "layer cake" corps
arrangement of NATO's Central Region. This "layer cake" displays NATO
solidarity. However, the action multiplies interoperability friction within
the NATO army groups. [Ref. 18:p. 51
The defense of western Europe will be a joint operation. A joint
operation has two levels. From the perspective of a nation's military, a
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joint operation is the integration of air, naval, and land assets into a
coherent force. From a coalition aspect, a Joint operation is the synchro-
nization of the member nations' combat power [Ref. 19 :p. 1131. "The cen-
tral military task confronting NATO planners is formidable: to integrate
the air, land, and sea forces of many countries, each with differing Joint
tactical doctrines and force structures." [Ref. 19:p. 113]
NATO's warfighting doctrine is difficult to state clearly. This is in
contrast to the clearly defined warfighting doctrine of the Warsaw Pact.
NATO members are unified against a common threat, but each nation
does not follow a detailed shared doctrine. [Ref. 20:p. 71
This chapter will explore NATO's warfighting doctrine. First, the
definition of "strategy" and the three "levels" of war will be presented. The
40-year evolution of NATO doctrine will then be covered. This is followed
by a development of "flexible response," which is the current NATO doc-
trine. Flexible response includes the concepts of forward defense and
follow-on-forces attack. In addition, the emphasis that NATO places on
winning its tactical battles forward in the corps sectors will be detailed.
Finally, the NATO document Land Forces Tactical Doctrine, Allied Tactical
Publication 35 (ATP-35 A), will be discussed.
B. STRATEGY AND THE LEVELS OF WAR
When an alliance is engaged in a war, it is critical for the coalition to
coordinate all actions, from the highest levels of strategy to the lowest
levels of tactical execution. A coalition's strategy provides the framework
for group cohesion. Alliance cohesion is of particular importance when
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the coalition is composed of democratic nations. To be a success, a coali-
tion strategy should address four guidelines. [Ref. 19:p. 51]
A coalition strategy's first prerequisite is to develop a strategy that is
based in reality. Detail is constantly changing and the coalition's strategy
must be adaptable to this change. A coalition must face certain facts and
deal with them effectively. These facts include the coalition's collection of
attitudes, perceptions, and character traits [Ref. 19 :p. 521. In addition,
an alliance may decide to avoid a particular issue. Avoiding a difficult
decision is one approach if the issue is deemed so destructive that the
unity of the coalition will be threatened.
A second necessity for a coalition strategy is that it must meet the
security needs of all parties. "With specific regard to NATO, a strategy
must satisfy two groups: those who emphasize the need to deter conflict
and those who emphasize the broader military problem of defending suc-
cessfully if deterrence fails." [Ref. 19:p. 52]
The third requirement for an alliance strategy is to build confidence
within the organization and mutual trust between alliance members.
Although complete trust can not be achieved in a diverse grouping of
nations such as NATO, the goal is to reach the highest possible level of
confidence. [Ref. 19 :p. 54]
The fourth aspect of strategy is the requirement to reinforce alliance
cohesion. NATO is bonded by a shared risk. The Western Alliance cannot
allow a member nation to feel excluded from the group. A successful
coalition strategy must create the impression of distributed risk among
all members. [Ref. 19:p. 56]
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Warfare is divided into three levels of war: strategic, operational, and
tactical. The strategic level calls for a nation's military to secure the
objectives of national policy by applying force or Its threat of use. The
operational level controls the use of military force within a military the-
ater of operation. The operational level of warfare seeks to fulfill strategic
objectives. "Most simply, it is the theory of larger unit operations." [Ref.
21:p. 2-31 Warfare's third separation is the tactical level. "Tactics are the
specific techniques smaller units use to win battles and engagements
which support operational objectives." [Ref. 21:p. 2-31
C. THE HISTORY OF NATO STRATEGY
The Western Alliance's warfighting doctrine is fundamentally defen-
sive. NATO does not plan to invade eastern Europe. NATO assumes that
the Warsaw Pact will initiate any assault on western Europe.
The strategy of the Western Alliance has evolved over the past 40
years. The first NATO strategy was "Forward Defense." This strategy,
which was adopted in the early 1950s. stressed the use of nuclear
weapons. One reason for this stress was the reality that NATO did not
possess the conventional forces necessary to provide the perception of a
strong conventional deterrent. By 1957, the doctrine of "Massive Retalia-
tion" became NATO's warfighting strategy. Massive retaliation is the
immediate release of nuclear weapons against the invading Warsaw Pact.
Massive retaliation and its near total reliance on nuclear weapons were
not actively supported in many NATO capitals. In 1967, NATO adopted
the policy known as "Fleidble Response." [Ref. 22:p. 2]
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D. FLEXIBI1 E RESPONSE
In a December 1988 report released by the General Accounting
Office (GAO), the authors state that NATO's strategy has 13 policies.
These 13 policies were established after research by the Conventional
Defense Study Group which was charged with providing the U.S. Con-
gress and the Secretary of Defense with an assessment of NATO and
Warsaw Pact balance of forces and ways to improve NATO's conventional
defenses. The study group received input from two separate panels of
experts concerning their perspectives on both U.S. and Soviet force levels
[Ref. 23:p. 2]. This GAO report warns that these policies are not always
followed by member nations. The 13 policies specified in the GAO report
are:







* High nuclear threshold desired
* First use of nuclear weapons, if required
* Minimum civilian casualties
* Minimum collateral damage
* Lowest credible force levels
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* Heavy reliance on: CONUS reserves, mobilization, airlift, and sealift
[Ref. 23:p. 911
In 1967, under the title of Document MC 14/3, the principle of flexi-
ble response was formally adopted by NATO. Flexible response directs
the Western Alliance to react to any Warsaw Pact action with an appro-
priate level of response. Furthermore, NATO reserves the right to escalate
a conflict. This escalation includes the use of nuclear weapons. Flexible
response creates the element of risk for the Warsaw Pact. NATO's objec-
tive is that the threat of nuclear war, with its destruction and uncer-
tainty, will outweigh whatever advantage the Warsaw Pact hopes to
achieve by invading western Europe. [Ref. 24:p. 51]
Flexible response is composed of two major concepts: "forward
defense" and "follow-on-forces attack." Forward defense is the corner-
stone of flexible response. Forward defense seeks to establish a defensive
line as close as possible to the border with the Warsaw Pact. NATO will
attempt to maintain the territorial integrity of its members. The Western
Alliance does not plan to surrender ground after only minimal efforts.
The consequence of a forward positional constraint is that NATO's battles
with the Warsaw Pact must be fought and won in the corps forward
defenses. Each NATO corps must maintain a forward line, shoulder to
shoulder with adjacent NATO corps. Battles fought in the corps forward
areas place heavy emphasis on the tactical level of war. [Ref. 22:pp. 2-41
Forward defense was at one time NATO's entire warfighting strategy
[Ref. 22:p. 3]. Forward defense has been extensively debated as not
making "military sense." However, the defense of West German territory
is critical to the people of West Germany. For example, West Germany
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has 25 percent of its industry and 30 percent of its population within
100 kilometers of the IGB [Ref. 10:p. 2611. An early loss of these West
German resources would severely affect the German will to continue to
fight.
Forward defense has its shortcomings, but few realistic alternatives
have been presented. Supporting West German interests is a major part
of NATO policy. In 1982, the West German Defense Minister Manfred
Worner stated:
The principle of Forward Defense is the heart of our strategy and is
vitally important to our state and the people who live in it. Alterna-
tive concepts which abolish the principle of Forward Defense and
substitute a war of attrition waged in our territory are unacceptable.
[Ref. 10:pp. 204-205]
The second component of flexible response is follow-on-forces attack
(FOFA). FOFA was adopted by NATO in December 1984. FOFA exists to
complement forward defense [Ref. 22:p. 41. Follow-on-forces attack calls
for attacks against targets in the 'Warsaw Pact's rear areas. FOFA heavily
relies on emerging technologies. FOFA's goal is to slow the ability of the
Warsaw Pact to bring their military forces into the forward battle and to
buy time for NATO [Ref. 24:p. 161. FOFA is a rededication to the proven
concept of deep air interdiction. If FOFA is failing, NATO's principle of
forward defense combined with nuclear weapons intends to preclude a
collapse of NATO's center sector. [Ref. 22:pp. 3-4]
In simple terms, FOFA means using longer range weapons-airplanes,
enhanced artillery, rocket launchers, and guided missiles-to attack
enemy ground forces that have not come close enough to NATO's
defending ground forces to engage them with direct combat. [Ref.
24:p. 16]
43
Flexible response has its critics. These critics may be placed in two
broad categories. The first group are those who feel that MC 14/3 is an
escalation ladder if deterrence fails. "We fight with conventional weapons
until we're losing, then we fight with tactical weapons until we're losing,
then we blow up the world." [Ref. 9:p. 5] The second group are those who
view forward defense as unworkable because NATO's military power is
placed too far forward. [Ref. 9:p. 51
E. THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TRIAD
Flexible response is supported by a triad of three components: con-
ventional forces, theater nuclear forces, and strategic nuclear forces [Ref.
24:p. 51]. One problem with this triad is the high costs associated with
constructing a "believable" deterrent.
Each leg of the triad cannot be purchased for the same price. For
example, of the triad's three legs, conventional forces are the most zxpen-
sive. Conventional forces must be supported by large numbers of sol-
diers, weapons, spare parts, training areas, and ammunition [Ref. 10:pp.
259-260]. Many NATO members are reluctant to finance a major
conventional force buildup. "Western Europe as a whole has preferred to
keep its comfortable standard of living rather than pay the cost of large
armies...." [Ref. 10:pp. 259-2601
Compared with the costs of conventional forces, nuclear weapons
are cheap. Additionally, nuclear weapons have a high return in their
destructive power when compared to their cost. This cost-benefit makes
nuclear weapons very inviting to many financially constrained NATO gov-
ernments. In addition, a nation which has the ability to employ nuclear
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weapons belongs to an exclusive group of nations and enjoys a degree of
world prestige by belonging to this nuclear club.
F. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DETERRENCE
Nuclear weapons are a major part of flexible response. Since World
War II, two schools of thought on nuclear deterrence have evolved. One
school favors improving NATO's conventional forces to gain more breath-
ing room between the failure of deterrence and the use of nuclear wea-
pons. In other words, this group seeks to increase the nuclear threshold.
This first concept is generally held by the United States. The second
school of thought seeks an earlier use of nuclear weapons. This early use
strategy enhances deterrence by making the consequences of an invasion
so terrible that the Warsaw Pact would never attempt an assault. This
second approach is supported by many Europeans who criticize the U.S.
position because it makes a central front conflict more believable. [Ref.
9:p. 61
The two opposing outlooks on nuclear weapons are very similar to
the two opposing views on what constitutes an effective NATO deterrent.
Europeans generally have identified deterrence as the dissuasion of
aggression through threat of punishment. The United States has
interpreted deterrence as the dissuasion of aggression through a
capability to deny the enemy its objectives. [Ref. 19 :p. 1091
This divergence between the two views of deterrence has major
implications for NATO's conventional defenses. The European view of
deterrence requires small conventional forces with enough strength to
handle a limited Warsaw Pact attack. Therefore, NATO does not require
large conventional forces because the Western Alliance would rapidly
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escalate to nuclear weapons to deter a full-scale Warsaw Pact invasion.
The European view seeks a balance between forces which may stop a
small-scale assault, but which are not too large to remove the threat of
rapid escalation to nuclear weapons. In contrast, the U.S. supports con-
ventional forces of sufficient power to prevent the Warsaw Pact from
quickly seizing NATO territory or, through the gradual use of nuciear
weapons, to inflict heavy damage on the Warsaw Pact. The U.S. view
believes an improved conventional force does not detract from nuclear
escalation. This divergence between the U.S. and some European leaders
affects efforto to improve NATO's conventional defenses [Ref. 19:p. 110.
The lack of NATO cohesion on conventional defenses creates a coalition
atmosphere which is not supportive of compromise or unity with regard
to military doctrine.
G. NATO CORPS DEFENSE
NATO wants thi battles of a future European war fought near the
border with the Warsaw Pact. NATO's goal is not to turn West Germany
into one large battle zone. With this fact, forward defense makes the ini-
tial corps and division battles extremely important. NATO land forces are
focused at winning at the corps level and, to be successful, the NATO
corps land forces must win their division-level battles. In light of this,
"NATO centralizes the functions of command and control at the corps
level." [Ref. 18:p. 91 For NATO, success at the strategic and operational
levels of war is based on NATO victory at the tactical level of war.
NATO does not officially acknowledge the operational level of war.
The Western Alliance makes a doctrinal jump by passing from the
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strategic directly to the tactical level of war [Ref. 18:p. 21. High-level
NATO commanders tend to view theater-level warfare as a series of corps
battles. "Therefore, it is a logical evolution that NATO's military con-
sciousness becomes focused on tactics at the expense of operational art."
[Ref. 18:p. 81
NATO's tactical mindset has placed significant responsibility in the
hands of its corps commanders. A result of the corps commanders'
increased responsibility is that NATO army group commanders have been
assigned the mission of providing primarily logistical and resource
support. [Ref. 18:p. 91
Hence, the corps commanders actually control the battle because
NATO perceives that only the corps commanders can gain the cru-
cial tactical victories required by strategic aims. The Operational
commander is to provide the corps as many resources as possible
and as little direction as necessary to harmonize them without ham-
stringing them. [Ref. 18:p. 91
NATO's tactical mindset is also seen by its selection of headquarters.
When NATO selected the "type" of headquarters to place between the
national corps and AFCENT, it picked the smaller army group instead of
the field army headquarters. "The army group matched the authority
NATO and its members wanted to give its commander." [Ref. 18:p. 101
An army group headquarters is normally an organization without
organic combat support units or sizable reserves [Ref. 18:p. 101. In con-
trast, the field army headquarters is a much stronger organization. Doc-
trinally, the field army headquarters is more powerful because it is
usually assigned a larger number of organic resources. The field army
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commander is traditionally more able to influence his subordinates by
the assignment (or denial) of the field army's larger resources.
The current NATO army groups do not have sufficient assets to fully
influence the battle.
A NATO Army Group command, without the assets and the author-
ity to employ them, "cannot directly affect the course of battle and is
therefore no command at all, but simply a switchboard or possibly a
bottleneck in the information flow between commands at higher and
lower levels." [Ref. 18:p. 101
A NATO army group commander is not totally powerless to influence
the defense of his sector. He has limited resources and is able to influ-
ence his corps commanders by exercising his role as their assigned mili-
tary commander. However, NATO's emphasis on the tactical level of war
hinders his ability to fully influence the battle.
Success with NATO's tactical mindset means all eight national
corps, in their sectors, must individually defeat their Warsaw Pact's
attacks. If one NATO corps fails, the adjacent NATO corps must adapt to
the "new" boundary or be placed in great risk as the Warsaw Pact
exploits the penetration. Additionally, NATO's tactical mindset creates
another problem. A penetration in one national corps has the potential to
unhinge the entire forward defense. There is a strong chance that the
Warsaw Pact will mass enough combat power against one corps to gain a
local advantage of possibly five or six to one [Ref. 18:pp. 14-15]. A com-
bat ratio of this magnitude will greatly increase the probability of a War-
saw Pact breakthrough.
... it is of little matter if heavily defended NATO corps conduct a
cohesive defense if lightly defended corps can be penetrated and the
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theater exploited... Therefore, success requires more than the con-
duct of a cohesive defense by individual corps. [Ref. 18:p. 15]
A strategic forward defense is vulnerable to penetration. If a pene-
tration of NATO's forward defenses does occur, NATO commanders must
have the ability to quickly react and attempt to regain the initiative.
NATO's attempts to regain the initiative may include crossing national
corps boundaries and counter-attacking into the flanks of the Warsaw
Pact. If the defending NATO units do not react in a timely manner, the
initiative would remain in the hands of the Warsaw Pact; this could
quickly lead to the defeat of NATO. With NATO's tactical mindset, the
NATO layer-cake defense, and a forward linear structure, NATO comman-
ders may not have the operational agility to handle a situation such as a
rapid Warsaw Pact breakthrough [Ref. 18:pp. 18-19]. One NATO effort to
"unify" the NATO national corps is a coalition warfighting doctrine which
is found primarily in ATP 35 A.
H. ALLIED TACTICAL PUBLICATION 35 A
NATO's current warfighting doctrine is a product of political and
military compromises which have taken place over four decades. NATO
does not have a clearly defined warfighting doctrine. This ambiguity is
"...compounded by a cacophony of national doctrines from each NATO
member." [Ref. 18:p. 22] However, NATO does make an effort in ATP 35
to create some type of formalized doctrine.
ATP 35 divides NATO defenses into three broad areas: the covering
force area, the main battle area, and the rear area.
This three-tiered organization of the battlefield is all that NATO's
doctrine calls for. Within this framework, each ally is free to
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establish an operational concept for defending its corps sector in the
Central Region. [Ref. 19 :p. 1381
The members of NATO express some support for unified effort and
harmony, but their operational doctrines do not demonstrate this har-
mony [Ref. 19:p. 138].
In any case nothing particularly brilliant in the way of manoeuvre
could be expected of the NATO forces as they are at present
constituted, for the variegated national corps structure is a "mighty
impediment to good command and control." [Ref. 10:p. 261]
Many NATO commanders express concern over the existence of the
wide number of divergent national doctrines, but creating a flexible
integration of these multinational units into an unified effort will be
difficult.
Commanders and staffs at all levels are required to become very
familiar with allied doctrine, procedures and terminology. Otherwise,
this could result in grave miscalculations by national and NATO
military commanders unaware of differences and unable to impose
unity of effort. [Ref. 18:p. 251
NATO warfighting doctrine is not easily defined. Forming a cohesive
doctrine for the Western Alliance is still an unsolved problem.
If called upon to defeat successful.- a Warsaw Pact invasion, NATO
armies must synchronize the defense under a shared Operational
art. "...blending the doctrinal philosophies and practical aspects of
the several NATO partners into a cohesive, energy-charged battle
force raises discomforting speculation on its effectiveness.. .This is
not measurable and by its nature is certainly subjective, but may be
NATO's most significant weakness and the one with the greatest
potential for exploitation by the Soviets." [Ref. 18:pp. 1-21
The eight forward corps of NATO are composed of units from five
national armies. These national units must maintain a forward defense
against a powerful enemy which has the ability to select the time and
location of his attack. These NATO corps must fight and win the forward
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battle; if not, the Western Alliance could face a quick defeat. NATO must
face this Soviet challenge without a unifying doctrine. This lack of a
coherent NATO doctrine does not reinforce the perception of deterrence,
makes NATO corps boundaries more vulnerable, and presents the
Warsaw Pact with a major opportunity for exploitation.
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V. THE CORPS, C3 , AND COORDINATION
A. INTRODUCTION
Deployed along NATO's Central Front are eight corps from five
nations. If war breaks out in Central Europe, these national corps will
carry the brunt of the ground fighting. For NATO's corps to be successful,
warfighting must be coordinated from the highest levels of NATO policy to
the lowest levels of execution.
The boundaries between corps and all military units are vulnerable
to exploitation. In a future European war, the Warsaw Pact will be the
offensive force and, consequently, has the ability to select the time and
location of its assault. Initially, the Western Alliance will be on the
defensive and forfeits the initiative to the attacker. For NATO to have a
greater chance of absorbing the initial Warsaw Pact assault, the national
corps must conduct boundary coordination as they recoil from an attack.
If proper boundary coordination is not completed, the chance for pene-
tration of NATO's forward defense will be enhanced.
The primary documents used to develop the corps are the U.S.
Army's Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, and FM 100-15, Corps
Operations. By explaining, from at least the U.S. perspective, what the
"ideal corps" is, a level of understanding is developed for a later analysis
of NATO's center sector corps.
The approach for this chapter will be to determine what a corps is,
what NATO C3 is, and how coordination is accomplished. In this chapter,
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particular emphasis is placed on issues such as the role of doctrine in a
military coalition, the special requirement for consultation in NATO, and
the concept of synchronization. Finally, this chapter will present two
examples which demonstrate the importance of synchronization and
coordination. The concept of synchronization will be shown in the actions
of General George Patton's Third Army during the Battle of the Bulge. In
addition, the need for coordination will be developed by comments
regarding potential boundary problems between two national corps in
NATO's center sector.
B. WHAT IS A CORPS?
The corps structure is not new for NATO's national armies. The first
corps was fielded by Napoleon during the French Revolution. The corps is
formed to perform operational and tactical level tasks. The composition of
the corps is established by an analysis of the missions assigned, the
expected length of operations, the enemy, the terrain, and the resources
available. A corps conducts three major types of operations: defensive,
offensive, and exploitation. In most situations, the corps will execute
these operations as part of a larger force. This larger force (in the case of
NATO, the army group) assigns the corps appropriate objectives which
should fit into a logical train of events leading to a desired outcome. Usu-
ally, the corps supervises the tactical operations of subordinate divisions
and forces. In most cases, the army group will assign the corps addi-
tional assets (e.g., reserves and logistical support). As explained in
Chapter IV, however, this is not always the case in NATO. [Ref. 25:pp.
1-1 to 1-4]
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The corps in NATO's Central Region do not all have the same orga-
nizational structure. To fully develop the organization of each NATO
corps is beyond the scope of this paper. However, this next section will
discuss the structure of a U.S. corps. The remaining NATO Central
Region corps possess some structural similarities with a U.S. corps.
U.S. corps are classified as either forward deployed or contingency.
This classification is based on the location of the corps and the missions
assigned. A forward deployed U.S. corps is found in an established the-
ater of operations under the control of the United States or as part of an
allied coalition (see Figure 6 for a diagram of a forward deployed U.S.
corps [Ref. 25:p. 1-71). The forward deployed U.S. corps in Europe, like
the V and VII U.S. Corps, operate under a NATO army group. During
peacetime, a forward deployed corps works from fixed bases and is gen-
erally able to maintain its equipment in a high state of readiness.
There is no standard U.S. corps organization. A U.S. corps is orga-
nized after an examination of doctrine and a mission analysis [Ref. 25:p.
1-101. Normally, a corps has from two to five divisions, aviation assets, a
corps support command, and a number of specialized units which sup-
port specific corps functions. These specialized units range in size from
brigades to companies or smaller detachments and provide combat,
combat support, or combat service support assistance [Ref. 25:p. 1-61. A
contingency corps has a more flexible structure and is tailored to con-
duct specific operations in different areas of the world.[Ref. 25:pp. 1-10]
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Figure 6. Forward Deployed U.S. Corps
The next section will develop certain aspects of command and con-
trol. In particular, this section will cover some of the special needs for
NATO's command and control structure.
C. WHAT IS COMMAND, CONTROL, AND CONSULTATION (C3)?
Command and control is a complex phenomenon. There is still
debate on the best definition of this phenomenon. The U.S. Military's
definition of command and control (C2) is: "Command and control is the
exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander
over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission." [Ref. 26:p. 8]
To assist the commander in exercising his auth .tty, various C2
functions are required. These functions are performed by: "...an
arrangement of personnel, equipment. communications, facilities, and
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procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinat-
ing, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the
mission." [Ref. 26:p. 9]
The command and control functions take place within a system.
NATO's command and control system has the added requirement for
consultation. Each member of NATO possesses an "equal" vote over criti-
cal NATO Council decisions. To reach a consensus on alliance goals,
extensive consultation between states must take place.
To control an organization such as NATO, the military-political
leader performs various tasks, one of which is synchronization. Synchro-
nization is the concentration of combat power in time and space. Syn-
chronization is the commander's most important task [Ref. 25:p. 1-41.
Synchronization will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. However,
questions such as "How does the commander synchronize his forces and
what guidelines does he follow?" must be kept in mind. Furthermore,
when the commander is physically removed from the fighting, he must
use indirect means to achieve synchronization. One of the means to
accomplish synchronization is through the use of common organizational
procedures. These procedures are found in sources such as a nation's or
coalition's military doctrine. [Ref. 26:pp. 20-251
One example of doctrine is the U.S. Army's Airland Battle. This U.S.
doctrine is a common organizational procedure and assists in the syn-
chronization of U.S. forces. Airland Battle will be discussed in Chapter
VI. The doctrine of Airland Battle is described in the U.S. Army's, Field
Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations. As stated in Field Manual 100-5:
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Subordinate leaders must align their operations with the overall
mission. They must develop opportunities that the force as a whole
can exploit. Large unit commanders must encourage initiative in
their subordinates.. .Success on the modern battlefield will depend
on the basic tenets of Airland Battle doctrine: initiative, depth,
agility, and synchronization. [Ref. 2 1:p. 2-11
Airland Battle doctrine is used by the U.S. commander to help in the
synchronization of his organization. Airland Battle doctrine provides a
general framework for commanders at all levels to use as a guide when
they make decisions. If a commander is unable to directly influence the
battle, his subordinates may rely on principles found in sources such as
a nation's warfighting doctrine. From a different viewpoint, if a subordi-
nate commander is in doubt regarding what to do and he is not able to
reach his senior commander, the tenets of a doctrine, like Airland Battle,
should guide his efforts and contribute to overall organizational syn-
chronization and coordination.
In summary, command and control functions coordinate military
power. Furthermore, the command and control system provides the
framework through which the commander communicates his intent to
subordinates and supervises execution. In NATO, consultation is needed
to align each member behind a common goal. Synchronization is impor-
tant to an organization. One means of achieving synchronization is
through a common military doctrine.
D. WHAT IS MiIITARY DOCTRINE?
Military doctrine has many definitions.
Military doctrine is an important, if often misused concept. It can
best be defined "...a body of theory which describes the environment
within which the armed forces [of a state] must operate and pre-
scribes the methods and circumstances of their employment. The
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primary function of such doctrine is to maximize the effectiveness of
a state's military capabilities in support of national objectives. A
country's military doctrine thus formulates the principles, objectives
and best means according to which that state, primarily in peace-
time, prepares for the eventual contingencies where military force
may have to be brought to bear, in peace or war." [Ref. 27:pp. 4-51
Military doctrine is used by the commander in his task of synchro-
nization. This common body of theory assists in focusing an organization
towards a common goal. If a doctrine is vague or misunderstood, the full
advantage of synchronization may not be realized.
It must also involve our allies to ensure the doctrine is agreeable to
NATO military and political leaders. Any intellectual vacuum must
be attacked so future applications of the doctrine are predicted and
refinements made. [Ref. 28:p. 35]
If a doctrine established at the highest levels of a military alliance is
not understood, the end result could be an organization lacking unity. As
noted by historian I.B. Holley:
Doctrine is like a compass bearing, it gives us the general direction
of our course. We may deviate from that course on occasion, but the
heading provides a common purpose to all who travel along the way.
This puts a grave burden on those who formulate doctrine, for a
small error, even a minute deviation, in our compass bearing upon
setting out, may place us many miles from the target at the end of
our flight. If those who instill doctrine from experience or devise it by
logical inference in the abstract fail to exercise the utmost rigor in
their thinking the whole service suffers. As the old Scot preacher put
it, a mist in the pulpit is a fog in the pews. [Ref. 29:p. 14]
A coalition is a special type of military organization. The operation of
a coalition requires different procedures, as compared to a nation acting
alone. Some of the special requirements for a coalition will be discussed
in the next section.
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E. SPECIAL NEEDS OF COALITION WARFARE
Throughout the history of the western world, there appears a series
of wars. Most of these wars have been fought as one collection of nations
fighting another group of nations. [Ref. 30:p. 51
To organize and focus a coalition is a difficult task. This task is
made increasingly complex when the states are independently minded,
democratic nations. In contrast, a coalition overshadowed by one power
creates a much simpler process. For example, of the nations belonging to
the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union is the dominant member and has a
major voice in virtually all actions [Ref. 30:p. 61. The internal dealings of
NATO are much different than the Warsaw Pact. The United States is the
commonly accepted leader of NATO, but "...if the Norwegians don't like
the fact that we are developing an artillery shell instead of getting it from
Kdngsberg, they tell us to go fly a kite." [Ref. 30:p. 6]
Consultation between states is a critical part of the NATO coalition.
How is a common doctrine achieved in a coalition? Marshall Foch once
said, concerning a doctrine for coalition war, it "...consists first in a
common way of objectively approaching the subject; second, in a com-
mon way of handling it." [Ref. 31:p. 131
During NATO's 40 years of existence, the alliance has been trying to
be a coalition of equal states. Diplomacy has been a part of this
approach. Ambassador Robert Komer, the former Under Secretary of
Defense for NATO Policy and ambassador to Turkey stated:
Yelling at them isn't good enough; I tried that. You've got to make
deals and tradeoffs.. .We have to be much more practical at working
out this sort of scheme. Changing the mindset, overcoming
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bureaucratic inertia, and concocting tradeoffs too good to refuse-
these are practical ways of doing business. [Ref. 30:pp. 6-7]
A successful alliance is an organization which suppresses national-
istic priorities for the common good. An effective coalition must have a
system to express the member nations' operational priorities [Ref. 31:p.
131. For NATO to be a successful alliance, the thinking of all nations
must follow a coalition approach. For example, the decisions of the U.S.
or West Germans, or other NATO members, must be made in the context
of their impact on NATO. This coalition approach stresses that working
together is more efficient than pulling apart. As stated by Ambassador
Komer in a 1983 speech, NATO must start "...getting governments to
realize that cooperation is going to be more cost-effective than the non-
cooperation we largely practice today." [Ref. 30:p. 91
NATO is a political and military alliance. This combination places
special demands on its command and control system. Furthermore, the
necessity of consultation is a critical requirement for a coalition. Consul-
tation places additional pressures on NATO's command, control, and
consultation system. Synchronization is an important part of an organi-
zation. Synchronization is assisted by means such as a common coalition
doctrine. Finally, a coalition approach should be used by NATO members
for the more efficient working of their alliance.
F. SYNCHRONIZATION
The term synchronization has appeared throughout this chapter.
The purpose of this next section is to provide a greater understanding of
synchronization. Synchronization is a complex idea. This section will
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present a definition of synchronization and a discussion of synchroniza-
tion in NATO. Following this discussion, the concept of combined arms
will be developed, followed by a historical example of synchronization.
The Battle of the Bulge and General George Patton's Third Army will
provide an example of the successful use of synchronization.
A NATO and Warsaw Pact war will be violent and confusing. The
corps commander must be able to shift his forces to the decisive location
at the most effective time.
This process of concentrating the combat power of the corps is the
synchronization aspect of corps operations. It is th -- primary task of
the corps commander. [Ref. 25:p. 1-41
A military commander must use all his available assets, at the cor-
rect time and to their fullest potential. In particular, if a commander is
fighting outnumbered, not properly using his limited resources would
increase his chances for defeat.
The goal of synchronization is to obtain the greatest possible combat
power from available military forces. Additionally, synchronization is
much more than ensuring all units are coordinated. If an operation is
synchronized, the effects of single units or weapons are increased far
beyond their individual effects. [Ref. 2l:p. 2-31
It [synchronization] results from an all-prevading unity of effort
throughout the force...Synchronized, violent execution is the essence
of decisive combat. [Ref. 21 :p. 2-31
In NATO, synchronization takes place on two levels. The first level is
synchronization between a nation's ground, air, and naval units. The
second level of synchronization is between the military forces of different
nations.
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Achieving synchronization in any military unit is difficult, and for
NATO it is even more challenging. The Western Alliance must achieve
harmony on both levels of synchronization. Furthermore, NATO forces
are not totally complementary. For example, synchronization is compli-
cated when adjacent units could be speaking a different language; have
varying standards of morale and training; or have different communica-
tion systems, varying organizational structure, and different types and
numbers of weapons systems. This adjacent unit also may have an
entirely different concept of "how to fight."
The term "combined arms" appears in military literature. Combined
arms is when two or more arms in mutual support produce complemen-
tary and reinforcing effects that neither can obtain alone. From a tactical
level, combined arms is when different types of units (such as armor and
mechanized infantry) coordinate their efforts. The armor and infantry
units receive support from artillery, engineers, aircraft, and air defense
units which assist the maneuver of the direct combat units. For example,
when an armor unit is moving through an urban area, infantry units
provide protection to the tanks as they move in the urban terrain. On the
other hand, armor will provide protection to the infantry in more open
terrain. Without the protection of infantry inside a city, armor vehicles
are at risk because many of a tank's advantages, like speed, are reduced
inside the confines of a city. Some of the same advantages of combined
arms take place at higher levels of war.
At the operational level, units of corps and division size maneuver to
envelop, penetrate, or block enemy forces [Ref. 21 :p. 7-41. Air assets are
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used to support the corps in its maneuver. These air units may perform
missions such as air interdiction, deep attack, the aerial resupply of for-
ward units, or the airlifting of military units. We will find in the upcoming
example of the Battle of the Bulge that the use of air assets, in the com-
bined arms sense, was a major factor in the U.S. victory. Additionally,
combined arms support may take place with naval assets, to include
naval air support, naval gunfire, or logistical resupply from off-shore
ships. Special forces operations may also contribute to the overall
maneuver of the corps by reporting on enemy movements or by destroy-
ing critical enemy assets. To achieve the greatest return from his military
forces, a military commander must synchronize his units- this includes
using the advantages of combined arms.
Although Airland Battle will be described in greater detail in Chapter
VI, synchronization is a major tenet of this doctrine. Airland Battle doc-
trine is used by the U.S. commander to assist in the synchronization of
his units. Additionally, synchronized operations achieve the maximum
return from a unit's combat power. The linkage between synchronization
and combined arms (from the perspective of Airland Battle) is found in
the following quote from the U.S. Army's Field Manual 100-5, Operations.
Synchronized, violent execution is the essence of decisive combat.
Synchronized combined arms complement and reinforce each other,
greatly magnifying their individual effects. [Ref. 21 :p. 2-3]
The principle of combined arms is a major part of synchronized
combat actions. Additionally, the benefits of combined arms occurs from
the tactical level of war to the operational and strategic levels of warfare.
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NATO commanders seek the same advantages achieved through
combined arms action. NATO commanders may task-organize their forces
to achieve the most potent mix of army, naval, or air units. The NATO
commander has the additional requirement of mixing the different types
of units from a wide number of nations. In addition, each nation has a
varying concept of how best to fight the enemy. To successfully accom-
plish the mixing of these units, the NATO commander must synchronize
the actions of the various forces.
In the U.S. Army's Field Manual 100-5, it states, "Complementary
combined arms should pose a dilemma for the enemy." [Ref. 21:p. 7-4]
Unfortunately for the Western Alliance, NATO's divergent forces and
doctrines create a "dilemma" for the NATO commander, who is trying to
form a cohesive military force. The NATO commander must overcome
these problems and others, all of which hinder his efforts in achieving
the most effective combined arms actions of his national units.
NATO's effort to achieve synchronization is not a new problem for
military units. Military history provides many examples of successful and
unsuccessful efforts to achieve synchronization. One example of success-
ful synchronization was the campaign fought between mid-December
1944 and mid-January 1945 by General George Patton's Third Army.
Patton's campaign started in response to the German Ardennes Offen-
sive, often known as the Battle of the Bulge. Winston Churchill once
described U.S. actions during the Battle of the Bulge as the greatest
American battle of World War II [Ref. 32:p. 2071. (See Figure 7 for a map
of the Battle of the Bulge [Ref. 32:p. 2141.)
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offensive, which was to start on 17 December 1944. Patton realized that
his offensive might have to be postponed. He directed his staff to prepare
plans to change the entire orientation of his army (which was facing east)
to the north and attack into the flanks of the German forces surrounding
Bastogne. On 19 December 1944, Patton was ordered to accomplish this
change and his army had to be at its new north start line by 22 Decem-
ber 1944.
... racing against time to shift a three corps, north-south battle line
to a four-corps line running east-west in the Saar. Hundreds of units
had to be moved quickly and efficiently,...Thousands of miles of tele-
phone had to be laid and an entire communication network, capable
of remaining operational despite both cold and enemy attack, had to
be established. A new supply system had to be set up, and thou-
sands of tons of supplies shifted for distribution or storage in new
depots and dumps.. At 0600 on 22 December, right on schedule, III
Corps attacked. [Ref. 32:p. 215]
The Third Army began its attack under terrible weather conditions.
The U.S. assault was hindered by fog, a blizzard, and below-freezing tem-
peratures. However, on 23 December the weather cleared and Allied air-
craft were able to assist the advance of the Third Army. Allied tactical
aircraft and bombers flew non-stop in support of American units in and
around Bastogne. This air support continued into the night when the
U.S. forces received cover from a night-fighter (P-61) squadron. U.S. Air
Force (Army Air Corps) assistance to ground units included the air-
dropping of supplies to the Americans inside of Bastogne. Additionally,
some American wounded were flown out of Bastogne using small obser-
vation aircraft. The U.S. control of the air by its aircraft eventually forced
the Germans to move at night to avoid the worst of the air assaults and
to fight from prepared positions during the daylight. U.S. air attacks
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coordinated with the ground assault greatly contributed to the success of
the Third Army. [Ref. 32:pp. 216-2201
The Germans never thought that Patton could "turn" an entire army
and attack so hard in such a short time. The U.S. Third Army drove
north against heavy German resistance and terrible weather to link up
with U.S. forces inside of Bastogne. What Patton had done was to change
the Third Army into a well-knit team capable of executing a complex task
under difficult conditions. With his well-trained army, Patton was able to
synchronize his assets in a timely manner, with the end result being the
ability to perform a challenging mission such as the U.S. counterattack
against the southern flank of the German penetration.
Though his reputation [Patton's] was made as a tank commander,
his army's success at the Bulge depended far less on spectacular
tank battles than on the superb coordination of armored, infantry,
artillery, air and support forces. (Ref. 32:p. 221]
The corps was one of the major building blocks for Patton's counter-
attack. The essential coordination aspects of a corps will be covered in
the next section.
G. COORDINATION BETWEEN CORPS
According to the U.S. Army's FM 100-15, Corps Operations, one
major mission of U.S. corps in NATO is to establish interoperability with
adjacent corps. This interoperability includes the following issues:
* Tactics
9 Maneuver





" Command, Control, and Communications
" Logistics
" Rear Area Security
" Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare
" Host Nation Support [Ref. 25:p. 1-81
The need for coordination between corps is critical for a number of
reasons. For example, understanding how a corps fights or how it will
maneuver is important to an adjacent corps. This understanding is of
particular importance when both corps are seeking to maintain a coher-
ent line of forward defense against the Warsaw Pact. At a minimum,
understanding how the adjacent allied units fight- their terminology and
doctrine- will be important for successful corps operations. Furthermore,
maneuver interoperability implies that NATO partners learn to employ
each other's maneuver forces. This maneuver interoperability requires
establishing and practicing operational procedures. [Ref. 25:p. 1-8]
H. THE COORDINATION PROBLEM
In a report, "Problems of Command and Control in a Major Euro-
pean War," NATO and Warsaw Pact command and control processes were
examined. This examination included the problem of NATO achieving
effective internal coordination. An example of potential coordination
problems will be detailed in a later example which describes actions
between the V U.S. Corps and the III West German Corps. To emphasize
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the importance of coordination, the authors of "Problems of Command
and Control in a Major European War" stated:
Coordination is the Achilles heel of the organizational strategy of
overcoming cognitive limits through specialization and division of
labor. The efforts of numerous individuals and separate groups of
individuals must be structured to form coherent and useful patterns
of activity. But this structuring task itself can easily become so
complex as to overwhelm the cognitive capacities of those who must
carry it out. Indeed, the high frequency of "coordination failure" sug-
gests that such problems commonly occur. [Ref. 2 0:p. 81
Organizations solve coordination problems In one of two ways. One
technique is to divide the primary task into a series of subtasks. These
Gubtasks are developed such that subunits can effectively execute all
their actions without regard to other subunits. However, few missions are
effectively decomposable in the long run [Ref. 20:p. 261. "Unfortunately,
organizational subunits often act as if their tasks are decomposable
when they are not: the Army builds tanks that will not fit inside Air Force
cargo planes...." [Ref. 20:p. 261
A second technique in solving a coordination problem is to rely on
hierarchy as a means for structuring tasks, communications, and
authority. In a hierarchical organization, large numbers of subunits can
be coordinated even when actual interaction between subunits is limited.
[Ref. 2 0:p. 261
A military commander is assigned a mission and a given amount of
resources. A commander may be called upon to solve an abstract p:ob-
lem, such as defending the Fulda Gap. Executing this type o-f mission is
a complex task. He solves this complex mission by subdividing the larger
task into subtasks for his subordinates. This subdivision process
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continues, in each level of command, until it reaches the individual
soldier.
In practice, however, human organizations must overcome a funda-
mental difficulty; namely, the necessity of assuring that the pattern
of activities being carried out by individuals in various sub-units of
the organization fit together in a relatively coherent fashion that
results in progress toward the organization's fundamental objectives.
[Ref. 20:p. 27]
When the primary unit's mission is subdivided into smaller tasks,
the original purpose of the primary task may become diluted. Six coordi-
nation mechanisms provide a means to avoid this problem: direct super-
vision, mutual adjustment, and standardization of work processes,
outputs, skills, and norms [Ref. 33:p. 4]. These six coordination tech-
niques will help the military commander achieve harmony of individual
and collective efforts.
In a military unit, direct supervision is a common type of coordina-
tion. Direct supervision is when a leader exercises control over his sub-
ordinates by allocating resources or by influencing the behavior of sub-
ordinates. [Ref. 20:p. 281
Mutual adjustment is the second coordinating mechanism.
Here, two or more actors agree to share resources and to confer with
one another concerning decisions that affect the outcomes of those
involved. In the resulting joint decision making process, none of the
actors is likely to dominate the others. [Ref. 20:p. 281
Standardization of skills is the third coordination mechanism. Stan-
dardization of skills is accomplished by an organization's members hav-
ing worked together, having been educated in similar military schools, or
having received similar training. The goal is to train all members to the
same standards and make them as "interchangeable" as possible.
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The standardization of processes and outputs is the next means of
coordination. These two types of coordination are accomplished by tools
such as standard operating procedures (SOPs). Standardization of pro-
cesses and outputs allows military operations to take place with a mini-
mum need for planning, effort, and direct supervision. Through SOPs,
the commander is able to influence the actions of subordinates by creat-
ing procedures governing their actions under specific circumstances. A
process becomes more ingrained the longer a subunit uses the SOPs of
the parent organization.
Moreover, subunits can coordinate with one another purely on the
basis of shared expectations. No direct communication is necessary
if each subunit can anticipate which SOPs other subunits will imple-
ment and what the outcomes will be. [Ref. 20:p. 28]
The standardization of norms is the sixth means of coordination.
When a commander is assigned a mission, he will seek to motivate his
unit towards mission accomplishment. He does this by ensuring that all
subunits understand their place in the larger plan and by encouraging
esprit. The commander hopes that if the situation becomes difficult, the
subunit will still seek to accomplish its mission. Additionally, a unit
which feels cohesive will likely be more cohesive when stressed. Cohesion
will help the unit reach a state of equilibrium instead of disintegrating.
I. HOW IS NATO COORDINATION ACHIEVED?
Coordination in NATO is accomplished by using the six coordination
mechanisms. For example, NATO coordination is achieved by means
which include direct supervision, NATO standardization documents,
common procedures and collective training.
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NATO commanders command very little in peacetime. NATO is an
organization which receives the bulk of its combat power in an emer-
gency and only after the national units are released by their respective
governments. In addition, diplomatic skills are imperative for NATO mili-
tary commanders as they work within NATO's political/military
structure.
Direct supervision is difficult to achieve in NATO's political/military
structure. Sixteen coequal peers cannot be directly told what to do. In
NATO, if a subordinate commander receives guidance from NATO which
he does not support, he may seek to appeal the issue back to his
national government or to a fellow countryman further up the NATO
chain of command.
In contrast to direct supervision, mutual adjustment is more com-
monly used in a peacetime NATO. Building consensus and the practice of
compromise are often used to achieve a unified NATO effort. For example,
one single nation, like Iceland, could refuse to ratify a NATO action. This
failure to reach total agreement among the 16 NATO members would
stop the NATO action. To avoid this indecision, mutual adjustment is
widely used to achieve coordination.
Standardization of processes Is the next means of NATO coordina-
tion. The Western Alliance has several committees whose mission is to
seek interoperability and consensus on critical NATO issues. Once con-
sensus is reached, these groups publish documents such as Standard-
ization Agreements (STANAGs) and Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs).
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With the publication of STANAGs or ATPs, NATO hopes that this new
concept will become part of each member nation's military procedures
and doctrine. The goal of these efforts is to permit the multinational
forces to operate smoothly and effectively together. [Ref. 2 1:p. 17-4]
Conducting peacetime, multinational training is another means of
coordination. These exercises would lead to the standardization of skills
among members. Furthermore, these exercises would develop procedures
which should be the basis for wartime operations. For example, these
training events develop liaison teams which operate between multina-
tional units. The liaison teams will have tasks such as coordinating intel-
ligence, fire support, combat service support, and host nation territorial
forces. Without these liaison teams, the boundaries between forces of
different nations would become increasingly vulnerable. [Ref. 21 :p. 17-5]
NATO hopes to achieve standardization of norms by stressing cohe-
sion among its members. Acaieving unity among 16 democratic nations
requires great effort. However, democratic nations have been unified in
past wars against a common threat. NATO's problem is to properly man-
age the emotional energies of its democratic members.
J. THE FULDA GAP AND THE U.S. V CORPS AND WEST GERMAN MII
CORPS
The Fulda Gap is a CENTAG responsibility. The V U.S. Corps and III
West Germany Corps guard the Fulda Gap and each must be prepared to
stop any Warsaw Pact assault. Both corps are fully prepared for combat
and do not suffer from acute equipment shortages or serious
73
maldeployme-it problems. These two national corps must achieve coordi-
nation along their shared border.
What are the problems of interoperability at this common border?
One problem is the differences between national warfighting doctrines.
The U.S. will fight using the Airland Battle doctrine and the West Ger-
mans will follow their mobile defense doctrine. The American and West
German commanders must synchronize their actions after taking into
account their two diverse warfighting doctrines. In addition, the exchange
of intelligence, fire support, and operational plans will take place using
liaison teams. These liaison teams are of critical importance because the
tactical-level U.S. and West German radios are not fully compatible. The
liaison teams will seek to achieve coordination across the language and
distance barriers and still provide timely guidance to their respective
commanders. It is open to debate whether or not this structure will be
able to produce timely coordination in the hostile environment of a mas-
sive Warsaw Pact assault.
The Fulda Gap is one of the most studied avenues of Soviet advance
into West Germany (see Figure 8 for a map of the Fulda Gap. [Ref. 10:pp.
304-3051). However, there is no clearly defined "gap" in the Fulda region.
Instead, this corridor is a zone of relatively accessible terrain which
starts in East Germany and extends to the outskirts of Frankfurt. [Ref.
10:p. 3061
Leading in and out of the Fulda Gap is a road network of strategic





sides of the IGB. For example. in the vicinity of the Eighth Soviet Guards
Army is the East German autobahn E63. Additionally, the Soviet First
Guards Tank Army may easily gain access to E63. The E63 connects
these Soviet garrisons with the Fulda Gap. When the E63 crosses the
Inner German border, it becomes the West German autobahn A4/E70.
This West German autobahn leads into another high-speed avenue of
approach, the A48/E4, which takes a traveler directly to downtown
Frankfurt. Also, as the Warsaw Pact attacker moves west, toward Frank-
furt, the terrain becomes more open and the defense will be based on a
series of hill masses [Ref. 10:pp. 306-3071. "Behind Bad Hersfeld the
road network branches out in a wide arc and here the German and
American forces will probably resort to a defense in depth...." [Ref. 10:pp.
306-307]
The border between the U.S. V Corps and West German III Corps is
located less than 10 kilometers from this critical autobahn system.
Although the responsibility for the defense of the E70 has been defined,
its location next to the border between two national corps could be a
problem. There is a high probability that the Warsaw Pact will advance
down this very lucrative E63-E70 corridor.
Units in combat naturally "close in" and do not normally "expand"
when in contact with an enemy. It is likely that the U.S. and West Ger-
man corps would not draw together when each corps becomes engaged
and begins to receive heavy losses [Ref. 341. If the two national corps
"contract" and "draw apart," will the autobahn leading directly into
Frankfurt become increasingly vulnerable?
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If Frankfurt is captured by the Warsaw Pact, NATO's Central Region
will be effectively cut in half. Maintaining NATO solidarity after a defeat
such as the loss of Frankfurt will be a major problem for the NATO
leadership.
This potential border problem between the V U.S. Corps and West
German III Corps is not NATO's most glaring coordination challenge.
Both the U.S. V Corps and the West German III Corps are powerful orga-
nizations and should be able to handle most situations. What if a weaker
organization is subjected to similar strains? Will a unit with limited com-
bat power or a unit from a different army group entirely be able to handle
the Warsaw Pact and a major boundary coordination problem? Besides
the problems of cross-corps coordination, the coordination between
NATO army groups is another challenge for the NATO commanders.
Initially, NATO's center sector has eight corps from five nations
arrayed against the Warsaw Pact. The corps is the primary building block
in the NATO defenses. Each of the five nations in the Central Region
plans to fight using different warfighting doctrines. With a NATO forward
defense, a breakthrough in one corps sector could lead to an unhinging
of the entire front. This makes the success or failure of individual corps
critically important to all corps commanders [Ref. 35: p. 37). To provide
national corps commanders with the greatest chance of success, syn-
chronization and interoperability must take place between NATO allies
and corps. If the five nations of NATO's center sector fail to communicate
in areas such as synchronization of forces, unit coordination, or war-
fighting doctrines, Warsaw Pact success against these national corps will
77
be enhanced. The next chapter will examine each of these national corps
and focus on their diverse warfighting doctrines.
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VI. THE CORPS OF NATO'S
CENTER SECTOR AND THEIR DOCTRINE
A. INTRODUCTION
NATO is a political and military coalition of democratic nations. A
reality of coalition warfare is that individual national warfighting doc-
trines are not always compatible with the doctrine of other alliance mem-
bers. National doctrines are a result of peacetime military and political
compromises. The problem of integrating national and alliance doctrines
is stated in a book entitle, Conventional Deterrence:
The central military task confronting NATO planners is formidable:
to integrate the air, land, and sea forces of many countries, each
with differing joint tactical doctrines and force structures. An effec-
tive alliance defense requires the acceptance of key strategic and
tactical doctrine so that a cohesive and coordinated effort will result.
The political reality is that these doctrines, developed and adopted in
peacetime, are the results of military and political compromise and
concession over many years and are difficult to amend with any
speed. Any proposed changes must be examined, staffed, and
approved by a complex allied bureaucracy. [Ref. 19:p. 113
It is very difficult for any individual or group to undo years of doctri-
nal concessions. Additionally, "The military reality is that these doctrines
reflect widely divergent force capabilities, based on different arrays of
weapons and equipment." [Ref. 19 :p. 113)
This chapter will present the various operational forms of defense.
Following this discussion, the individual corps of NATO's center sector
are examined. The emphasis is on the warfighting doctrines of the U.S.,
West German, British, Belgian, and Dutch Corps. After the five national
doctrines are explained, the doctrines will be compared and contrasted.
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This comparison is accomplished by placing each national doctrine on
similar terrain and in a common scenario. Finally, comments are pre-
sented concerning the possible implications of NATO having such diverse
warfighting doctrines.
B. DEFENSIVE FORMS
An army conducts one of four operational forms of defense: area,
linear, mobile, and aggressive. However, most defensive plans are a com-
bination of the four "pure" forms. A nation develops its defensive doctrine
after an analysis of the missions assigned, the troops/equipment avail-
able, the enemy, the terrain, weather, logistics, and time. [Ref. 19:p. 1401
Area defense is structured to use a battlefield's "depth." The
defender desires to draw the attacker into a series of defensive belts and
strongpoints. The defender fights the battle from various fighting posi-
tions. Within this series of defensive positions, the attacker should suffer
attrition and become increasingly disorganized. Although not desired, a
penetration of the defender's forward line could be accepted. The
defender's final goal is to defeat the attacker by attrition or by the execu-
tion of a decisive counterattack once the attacker becomes weakened.
[Ref. 19 :p. 1401
A linear defense is when the defender constructs a barrier and
attempts to keep the attacker from penetrating this barrier. The defender
wishes the attacker to suffer heavy losses by assaulting his fortified posi-
tions. Although the defender may create small reserves, the bulk of the
defender's forces are forward along the barrier. An example of a linear
defense was the French Maginot Line. [Ref. 19:p. 1401
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The mobile defense is designed to stop an armor-heavy attack. The
defender divides his forces and sector into three zones. The three zones
are the Covering Force Area (CFA), the Main Battle Area (MBA), and the
Rear Area (RA). In the CFA, cavalry-type units are deployed to gain initial
contact with the attacker. The covering force units seek to channelize the
attacker into preselected avenues and to identify the attacker's main
effort. The covering force wants to avoid becoming decisively engaged.
Additionally, the covering force warns the main battle area of the
attacker's advance. The majority of the defender's combat power is
deployed in the MBA. The defender defeats the attacker by using strong-
points, battle positions, and local counterattacks. If the MBA is breached,
reserves from the rear areas will attempt to seal the penetration. Once
the attacker is stopped, the defender hopes to counterattack and either
destroy the attacker or force him to withdraw. [Ref. 19:p. 1401
The aggressive defense may be best summarized in the adage that
"the best defense is a good offense." The defender wants to seize the ini-
tiative early and quickly defeat the attacker [Ref. 19:p. 1411. An aggres-
sive defense was demonstrated by the Israeli Defense Force's preemptive
attack during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War
The Western Alliance allows wide div _nce in the warfighting doc-
trines of each of the five national corps in NATO's center sector. There is
sufficient variety among these five NATO nations that adjacent corps
would be executing completely different operational "forms" of defense.
[Ref. 10"p. 1411
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The next section describes the five national corps of NATO's center
sector. Following this description, the corps are placed in a common sce-
nario and terrain. The individual corps are then examined with the fol-
lowing issues receiving particular emphasis: flank coordination, potential
Warsaw Pact reaction to a national doctrine, and issues such as the use
of time and resources.
The terrain of NATO's center sector is varied from northern Germany
to southern Germany. However, the landscape of the North German Plain
is relatively "simple." The North German Plain is generally flat or gently
rolling and criss-crossed by water obstacles. See Figure 9 for a map of
the North German Plain. [Ref. 10:p. 2881 The North German Plain will be
used to provide the common terrain basis for comparing each corps. See
Chapter II for a detailed description of the North German Plain.
The scenario into which each national corps will be placed is a
Soviet army attacking a NATO corps. For further information concerning
Soviet/Warsaw Pact doctrine, see Chapter III. A Soviet army offensive
operation normally covers a frontage of 60 to 100 kilometers. A simplified
diagram of a Soviet army offensive operation Is seen in Figure 10 [Ref.
17:p. 4-71. With the possible exception of the VII U.S. Corps and the II
West German Corps, the remaining Central Region NATO corps each
defend a frontage of less than 100 kilometers. A Soviet army usually con-
tains three to six tank or motorized rifle divisions. [Ref. 17:pp. 4-6 to 4-71
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Figure 9. The North German Plain
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Soviet Army Offensive Operation (Variants)
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(1) Several variants are depicted.
(2) Combined Arms Army (CAA) depicted consists of 3 motorized nile divisions (MROL a tank division (TO). and an independent tank regiment (T).
(3) CAA main attack could be on axis 1 or axis 3. Supporling attack on oxis 2.
(41 Frontage: approximately 60 km.
(5) Depending an CAA missions aind/or development of battle, second echelon could be committed to:
- mintain momentum on axis 3
- secure OMG lines of communication on axis I
- develop opportune success on axis 2
(6) Flexibility most apparent at operational (Army and front) level.
Figure 10. Soviet Army Offensive Operation
C. THE AMERICAN ARMY IN EUROPE (V AND VII U.S. CORPS)
General Rogers, a former SACEUR, stated that the U.S. Army has
two major goals in Europe. The first goal of U.S. forces is to deter a War-
saw Pact attack. The second goal is to have American soldiers present to
assure Americas European allies that the United States remains commit-
ted to the defense of western Europe. By stationing American citizens,
potentially in "harm's way," it is hoped that western Europeans will be
confident of U.S. resolve. [Ref. 36:p. 3071
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U.S. land forces fall into one of four categories. The first group are
U.S. forces stationed in Europe. The U.S. has approximately one-third of
its active army in Europe. These American forces include the U.S. V and
VII Corps. The U.S. V and VII Corps are composed of two armored cavalry
regiments, two armored divisions, two mechanized divisions, and one
balanced brigade of two armor battalions and two mechanized infantry
battalions. In addition, one mechanized brigade is stationed in NORTHAG
and one infantry brigade is in West Berlin. American units in the first
group have modem equipment and are maintained in a high state of
preparedness. [Ref. 9:p. 321
The second group of forces is garrisoned in the continental U.S. but
has prestocked equipment in Europe. In 1990, these forces consist of one
corps headquarters (Ill Corps), one armored cavalry regiment, two
armored divisions, and three mechanized divisions. [Ref. 9:p. 32]
The third group consists of U.S.-based active divisions which may
require National Guard "round out" forces. This group includes units
such as the XVIII Airborne Corps and some of the U.S. Army's light
infantry divisions. Units in the third category have contingency missions
which might take them to Europe. [Ref. 9:pp. 32-331
The fourth category includes National Guard and Reserve units. This
group could supply NATO with up to nine Isions, 26 brigades, and
large numbers of artillery, engineer, combat support, and service support
units. [Ref. 9:p. 33]
The U.S. Army has developed an aggressive defense doctrine. This
doctrine calls for executing simultaneous attacks into the depths of the
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attacker. These deep attacks would aim for vulnerable points in the
attacker's military structure. "This is not a new discovery. US, German,
and Israeli campaign plans have historically made use of long-range
interdiction to gain local battlefield advantages." [Ref. 2 1:p. 7-13]
Deep battle attacks are conducted by air and artillery assets. Con-
ventional and unconventional forces may also interdict enemy move-
ments. The goal of fighting the deep battle is to disrupt the enemy in his
attempts to mass his forces and create opportunities for U.S. offensive
strikes which would defeat the attacker in detail. [Ref. 21:p. 7-131
Deep battle opens opportunities for decisive action by reducing the
enemy's closure rate and creating periods of friendly superiority in
order to gain or retain the initiative. If the enemy is prevented from
reinforcing his committed forces, even temporarily, he may be
defeated piecemeal. [Ref. 21:p. 7-141
At the same time, the U.S. Army will conduct a defensive battle
along the front line which is characterized by defensive positions, delay-
ing actions, and counterattacks. Under the title of Airland Battle, this
doctrine has been evolving for many years from the static defense of the
1960s to the concept of an active defense during the 1970s. Then, in the
1980s, the U.S. Army developed an aggressive defense which stresses
maneuver: the Airland Battle. [Ref. 19:p. 1411
The Airland Battle plan concentrates on the operation of corps level
combat units that seek to deny victory to the attackers by disrupting
the synchronization of their force echelons and seizing the initiative.
Its stress is on manceuvre, using air power to strike against second
echelon forces, and it requires a considerable integration of force
strength at the corps level in order to fight the two battles simulta-
neously. The aim is to disrupt the attacker's synchronization of
forces and to turn the battle to the advantage of the defending
forces. [Ref. 3 7 :p. 621
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A former U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
special assistant to the commanding officer, General Donald Morelli,
described Airland Battle as a soccer game as compared to a football
game. "The Army," he argues, "should stop thinking of battle as a football
game, in which players assume fixed positions, and start emulating soc-
cer, in which play shifts rapidly from one part of the field to another and
players decide independently what to do." [Ref. 38:p. 401
If a U.S. corps fights a Soviet army on the North German Plain,
which is where the III U.S. Corps is scheduled for deployment, the Ameri-
can units should follow a variation of the official U.S. Army doctrine of
Airland Battle. Although Airland Battle is the current doctrine of the U.S.
Army, it is not totally embraced by U.S. forces assigned to NATO. General
Rogers, when he was SACEUR, publicly stated that he would not use
Airland Battle in NATO. He recognized that in NATO's coalition warfare,
political, economic, strategic, and social factors will also affect military
operations [Ref. 19:p. 1421. However, for the purposes of this evaluation,
the U.S. corps in NATO will follow Airland Battle as their NATO doctrine.
D. U.S. SCENARIO
A U.S. corps executing Airland Battle on the North German Plain will
seek to gain the initiative. Initially, the Warsaw Pact will have the oppor-
tunity to select the time and location of its attack. The U.S. corps com-
mander will fight two battles- one deep and one following the line of
enemy contact. His deep battle will be fought using primarily artillery
an-' fixed wing air assets.
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The U.S. commander will attempt to deceive the enemy. Additioually,
the U.S. Army's FM 100-5 states, "Offensive combat 19 as much a part of
defensive operations as strongpoint defenses or delaying actions." [Ref.
2 1:p. 10-11 With this principle, the U.S. commander will attempt to con-
tain the enemy where he must and counterattack at the decisive time
and place.
The U.S. commander will seek to strike the attacking first echelon
Warsaw Pact divisions in their flanks or rear and destroy them piece-
meal. His deep battle will attempt to control the Warsaw Pact's commit-
ment of his second echelon divisions. For the U.S. corps commander,
Airland Battle is a risky strategy with the potential for large rewards or a
defeat. For example, a strictly linear strategy is usually more predictable
in its outcome- an attacker either penetrates the defenses or he does
not. In contrast, a maneuver-based defense is more fluid and, conse-
quently, the battle's outcome is harder to predict.
As part of his defensive preparations, the U.S. corps commander
must decide how to employ his limited resources. In other words, artillery
batteries fighting the deep battle are not directly available to support U.S.
units in actual contact with the enemy. Additionally, if NATO is fighting a
FOFA battle, some air assets may not be available to the U.S. corps. Also,
the U.S. corps does not have the ground assets to offer a staunch defense
at every point along his long front line. If the U.S. corps wants to defend
everywhere on the North German Plain, the U.S. forces would have to be
spread quite thin. Furthermore, this weakened front line will be even
weaker if the U.S. commander wishes to maintain a large reserve.
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The flanks of the U.S. corps may not be firmly set. Actions such as
"deep attacks" or bold offensive maneuvers with ground units are at
times executed with the risk of not maintaining perfect flank coordination
or security.
The terrain of the North German Plain is able to support an aggres-
sive form of defense. The North German Plain has limited manmade and
natural obstacles (as compared to southern Germany) and allows both
sides the opportunity for maneuver.
The Warsaw Pact will have difficulty in attacking the U.S. corps. The
American equipment is excellent and their command and control system
is generally adequate. If the U.S. corps commander is able to gain the
initiative, Airland Battle may prove decisive. However, the U.S. corps is
vulnerable. For example, if the Warsaw Pact is able to force a penetraticn
and attacks the U.S. logistics system, the "bold" maneuvers of the U.S.
units may stop for lack of supplies. Additionally, if the Warsaw Pact is
able to attack the U.S. command and control system, the American
commander may be unable to exploit potentially decisive opportunities.
U.S. Army doctrine calls for an aggressive defense. Deep attacks will
be conducted by various weapons which may or may not be under the
direct control of the U.S. corps commander. The American commander
will seek to maintain the initiative and execute a defense based on the
mobility of his units.
E. THE GERMAN ARMY (I, 1I, AND M WEST GERMAN CORPS)
The Federal Republic of Germany supports the largest, the most
powerful, and one of the best-equipped armies in western Europe. The
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active strength of its armed forces is approximately 495,000. The West
German army maintains high standards of training. Additionally, the
West German army is supported by an efficient reserve and conscription
system. [Ref. 9:p. 431
The ground forces of the West German army are divided into the
Field Army and the Territorial Army. The Field Army contains 12 divi-
sions, consisting of six armored, four mechanized, one mountain, and
one airborne division. The Territorial Army is composed of 12 home-
guard brigades, which are generally responsible for rear-area security.
Furthermore, a large number of local defense units, reserves, and sup-
port units provide assistance to NATO. [Ref. 9:pp. 43-44
The West German Army is not deployed as a single entity. West
German corps are intermixed with the other national corps of the Central
Region. The Field Army is divided into three corps sectors and two inde-
pendent divisions. In northern Germany. the 6th Panzer Grenadier Divi-
sion is under the control of Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTIH.
The 6th Division protects Schleswig-Holstein and cooperates with the
Danish Army in the defense of the Danish peninsula. Under the guidance
of Allied Forces Central Europe are three West German corps and the
remaining independent division. The I German Corps has one mecha-
nized and three armored divisions. This is the most powerful German
corps. The I German Corps helps NORTHAG defend the North German
Plain. In CENTAG there are two German corps. The German III Corps has
one mechanized division and two armored divisions. III Corps covers the
northern half of the Fulda Gap. The II German Corps is in southern
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Germany. II Corps consists of one armored, one mechanized, and one
mountain division. II Corps has partial responsibility for defending the
West German-Czechoslovakian border. [Ref. 36:pp. 234-235]
The West German army is well armed. For example, the West Ger-
mans have more than 4,250 main battle tanks [Ref. 10:p. 204]. The
army's main battle tank is the Leopard II, which is similar to the U.S. M1
tank. Both the Leopard II and M1 are equal to or better than any Warsaw
Pact tank. [Ref. 9:p. 43]
The Army of West Germany is impressive, but its long-term effective-
ness will be hindered by a declining West German birthrate. This decline
started in the 1960s and continues into the 1990s. The typical West
German woman will bear an average of only 1.4 children. [Ref. 10:p. 2041
West Germany still has the largest population in European NATO,
but the reserve of manpower of military age is drying up fast. In
1984 the annual requirement...was drawn without difficulty from
the pool of about 310,000 young men, but by 1992 the number
available will have shrunk to 160,000, which will add to the diffi-
culty of defending the Central Front by conventional means. [Ref.
10:p. 2041
The Army of West Germany plans to conduct an armor-heavy mobile
defense. When the West German commander identifies the decisive point
and time, he launches a counterattack.
Defensive positions are prepared and occupied. Forward units fight
to channelize the attacking formations. [Ref. 19:p. 1411
The stress in the German Army is on a mobile defense. This mobile
defense concept is demonstrated by the high mechanization of the Ger-
man army. Since the post-World War II formation of the new West Ger-
man army, their military doctrine has been modified to reflect the
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strength of the army, the political reality of forward defense, and the
problem of a nation lacking "depth."
The German Army today is caught in a doctrinal and strategic
dilemma. Its operational model has historically been a defense in
depth: the timing of decisions was critical, while space was not...
Today, the German Army, as part of NATO, does not have the space
to retire and subsequently stretch out an opponent's thrusts...
However, the requirement to defend forward does not mean a linear
defense in-place. Historically, a cordon defense is known to fail.
Within the context of HDv 100/100 (A West German Army Pub-
lication, "Command and Control in Battle"), there is room to believe
that the Germans are again looking toward a form of maneuver war-
fare that could "vet" the strength of an armored thrust from Warsaw
Pact nations. The Germans would trap the leading echelons of a
Warsaw Pact attack by driving flank counterattacks between the ini-
tial and follow-on echelons of the standard Warsaw Pact operation.
Numerous division and corps level operations on the Eastern Front
were carried out using a similar scheme. [Ref. 39, pp. 118-1201
The West German Army has received criticism for its dedication to
forward defense.
The concept of forward defense has become the center of consider-
able controversy. It has become popular to deride it as defense that
is Maginot style, passive, static, inflexible, and linear. This is of
course an exaggeration...the Bundeswehr has always stressed the
virtues of mobile defense...the Germans have been at variance with
some of their allies whose attrition-and-fall-back-oriented defense
concepts were much less flexible. [Ref. 40:p. 1631
In countering criticism against the West Germans, the key point to
consider is that forward defense is not a tactical warfighting doctrine, but
strategic guidance from NATO and West German political leaders.
General von Sandrart, a former West German Chief of Staff, stated that
forward defense is "...an operational umbrella concept of the Alliance, but
not a tactical doctrine of how to fight the battle at division or brigade
level." [Ref. 41:p. 19 Additionally, the German Ministry of Defense's 1983
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White Paper wrote "...the principle of Forward Defense does not consti-
tute an obstacle to the necessity of mobile defense." [Ref. 41:p. 19]
F. GERMAN SCENARIO
The German army will conduct a mobile defense. The German units
should also be highly motivated because they will be defending their
homeland. The strongest German corps (I Corps) defends the North Ger-
man Plain. The West German I Corps consists of four divisions. These
four divisions are deployed two "up" near the IGB and two "back" behind
the forward divisions. [Ref. 10:p. 2891
A mobile defense has proven to be successful in other wars., but a
West German mobile defense is hindered by NATO's lack of depth. To be
successful, a mobile defense usually requires depth to "stretch" the
attacker and present opportunities for decisive counterattacks. The North
German Plain does not offer great depth and makes a mobile defense
possible but more difficult.
Another potential problem for the German corps is if an adjacent
corps suffers a penetration. This penetration could expose a flank of the
German corps. With this exposed flank, the German commander's plans
for a mobile defense may be upset when he must defend not only his
frontline but also his flanks. Furthermore, if an adjacent corps is con-
ducting an area defense, this may force the German commander to
modify his plans by requiring him to anchor his flanks with the area
defenses of a neighboring corps.
If a German corps fights on the North German Plain, it should be
successful in the early stages of the war. The Soviets fought against a
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mobile defense in World War II. The Red Army suffered heavy losses but
eventually won by weight of numbers. Also, one key difference between
World War II and a future World War III is the potential battlefield. The
North German Plain is not the steppes of the Soviet Union. The North
German Plain's lack of depth may lead to a different outcome than the
German Army's World War II mobile defense fought in the vastness of the
Soviet Union. For example, in a future war in northern Germany, the ini-
tial echelons of the Soviet army could wear down the German units. The
German units will be conducting a defense forward near the IGB and
they do not have a great deal of "depth" in which to maneuver. Soviet
doctrine stresses an attack in echelons. Follow-on Warsaw Pact echelons
could seek opportunities for penetration against the now-weakened Ger-
man corps. One of these echelons could exploit an identified weakness
(such as a NATO corps boundary). force a breakthrough, and drive
across the North German Plain.
The West German army plans to conduct a mobile defense of its
homeland. This defense will start as close as possible to the border with
the Warsaw Pact. The goal of the West German army is to occupy defen-
sive positions and channelize the attacker's formations. The West Ger-
mans will wait for the decisive moment and launch counterattacks to
repel the invader.
G. GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE GERMAN AND AMERICAN
CORPS IN CENTAG
CENTAG's terrain does favor the defense. Also, the U.S. and West
German corps are strong and well equipped. However, there are qualifi-
94
cations to the defensive strength of CENTAG. First, the U.S. and German
units are spread thinly. The four corps of CENTAG must cover a front of
approximately 590 kilometers. This distance is compared to the almost
210 kilometers allotted to NORTHAG's four corps. Furthermore, the
CENTAG commander must watch for a Warsaw Pact flanking maneuver
through "neutral" Austria. This Pact flanking option adds another 170
kilometers to CENTAG's front line. [Ref. 10: p. 302]
West Germany's narrow waist is a second major problem for the
defenders of the Central Region. This narrow waist is near the border
between NORTHAG and CENTAG. A Warsaw Pact assault at this slender
area would put the Warsaw Pact in the suburbs of Frankfurt after
advancing only 110 kilometers. Also, a Warsaw Pact move of 200 kilome-
ters would place Warsaw Pact tanks in the West German capital of Bonn.
Additionally, the "bulge" in the southwest comer of East Germany allows
the Warsaw Pact to use interior lines. For example, NATO commanders
must decide if the Soviet Eighth Guards Army would focus its main effort
directly west toward the Rhine or south into Bavaria.
H. THE BRITISH ARMY OF THE REIIINE (I BRITISH CORPS)
The British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) consists of four armored divi-
sions and one artillery division [Ref. 36:p. 341. In times of emergency, five
infantry brigades are scheduled for early deployment from England.
About 159,000 British soldiers are stationed in West Germany [Ref. 9:pp.
40-411. The BAOR defends a front of 60 kilometers.
The I British Corps is undergoing a slow but steady modernization
program. The new Challenger tank, an improved infantry-fighting vehicle,
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and other items are entering the inventory [Ref. 9:pp. 40-41]. The equip-
ment of the I British Corps is good but complex. For example, there are
...over 40 different types of vehicles, 5 radar systems, over half a
dozen major command and control nets, 11 types of artillery pieces
of different sizes, 10 rocket systems, 6 types of aircraft, and over 20
small arms, mortars, and mine types. [Ref. 36:p. 351
The British forces are highly trained and professional. Britain is the
only major European power which supports an all-volunteer military.
[Ref. 9:pp. 40-411
How will the I British Corps hold up against a Warsaw Pact assault?
Based upon the demonstrated quality of the British infantry during the
Falklands and the high respect in which other NATO allies hold the
British, in all probability, the British small units will perform rather well.
[Ref. 36:p. 351
The British warfighting doctrine is a modified area defense. This
doctrine states that:
Strong forward defensive positions will be backed up by smaller
scattered multiple antitank fighting positions of about squad or pla-
toon size. The antiarmor elements will allow enemy armor to pass
and then engage them from the flanks and rear. At a decisive
moment, a counterattack will repel the enemy from the British sec-
tor. [Ref. 41:p. 181
I. BRITISH SCENARIO
The I British Corps will fight using a modified area defense. This
operational form of defense may become vulnerable on the North German
Plain. For example, the Soviets have an advantage in numbers of artillery
pieces and an edge in the quantity of armored vehicles. Using these two
advantages, the Soviets will attempt to isolate British strongpoints and
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force a breakthrough. In an area defense, a penetration along one Soviet
avenue of advance could lead to the bypassing of some of the defender's
fighting positions. Garrisons of these isolated strongpoints, which are left
in the rear of an advancing enemy, could suffer from demoralization.
However, the proven strength of the British small unit leadership could
mitigate this demoralization and make most of the small British antitank
positions effective against Warsaw Pact units.
Flank coordination with adjacent national corps might be a problem
in the British area defense. One example could be if the I British Corps is
conducting a successful area defense but an adjacent corps suffers a
penetration and begins to withdraw. The once-successful British area
defense may now become exposed and vulnerable. NATO follows a doc-
trine which is generally a linear forward defense. This may require each
corps to withdraw "in line" with its neighboring corps to maintain the
integrity of the overall NATO defensive situation.
The Warsaw Pact will attack an area defense using its advantages in
artillery and armored vehicles combined with other military assets. For
example, the Soviets may "fix" certain British strongpoints by the use of
persistent chemical agents. Massed artillery and armor from the first
echelon divisions could then force a penetration. Follow-on divisions from
the second echelon could exploit the breakthrough. The I British Corps
does have an effective armor counterattack force, but if this force suffers
attrition early in the war, the British defenses will be degraded. Soviet air
assets could play a role in isolating these British counterattack forces.
The I British Corps on the North German Plain should be able to conduct
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a strong defense and inflict heavy losses on the attacking force. If the
British units suffer attrition and are not reinforced, however, their area
defense may eventually dissolve.
The I British Corps will follow a modified area defense. The defense
of the British sector will be structured in depth, starting at the IGB.
Strong forward positions are backed by squad or platoon antitank fight-
ing positions. The British may allow enemy armor to pass their positions
and engage them from the rear and flanks. If the proper opportunity pre-
sents itself, the British will execute a counterattack.
J. THE BELGIAN ARMY (I BELGIAN CORPS)
Belgium has a population of approximately ten million people and an
active military of 93,000. Belgium maintains two divisions of armor and
mechanized infantry, plus assorted light infantry battalions. These units
are assigned to the I Belgian Corps. The Belgian Corps is responsible for
a 40 kilometer sector which corresponds with the Harz mountains [Ref.
10:p. 300].
A large portion of the Belgian forces dedicated to NORTHAG are not
garrisoned in West Germany. "The fundamental problem is that the
Belgians are not available in sufficient force to withstand a surprise
attack." [Ref. 10:p. 3001 For example, of the I Belgian Corps' two divi-
sions, only the 16th is present in West Germany in strength. Addition-
ally, the peacetime barracks of the 16th Division are widely scattered on
both sides of the Rhine and are located a great distance from its forward
battle positions. Also, the headquarters of the other Belgian division, the
1st, is located inside of Belgium. The location of the I Belgian Corps
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peacetime garrisons require the early warning and deployment of Belgian
forces to their forward positions. If Belgian units are net alerted and
moved in time, there could be a large gap in NORTHAG's forward
defenses. On average, I Belgian Corps units, with peacetime garrisons in
Belgium, will have to move over 200 kilometers to reach their assigned
positions.
Belgian forces have suffered from funding restrictions. This eco-
nomic austerity has resulted in equipment obsolescence. For example,
the main battle tank of the Belgian army is the aging Leopard 1. The
Leopard 1 is not an able opponent for the T-80 tanks of the Soviet Third
Shock Army or Eighth Guards Army. These two Soviet armies have the
potential to attack into the Belgian sector. Furthermore, there are no
plans to procure new tanks. The Belgian artillery is also suffering from
funding shortfalls. In the I Belgian Corps, there are only two active self-
propelled 155 mm battalions and one 203 mn battalion. There is only
one reserve 203 mm battalion to support this small active artillery force.
[Ref. 9:pp. 44-451
When reinforced from its homeland, the I Belgian Corps will attempt
to establish an area defense. "The Belgian army plans to conduct a
somewhat fluid variation of the classical area defense in depth." [Ref.
19:p. 1421 This area defense in depth calls for overlapping platoon and
company fighting positions. These positions will be established in depth
throughout the sector.
No large reserve is deployed in Germany. The corps will depend on
the arrival of mobilized reserves from Belgium to perform the
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essential reserve missions of counterattack and reinforcement. [Ref.
19 :p. 1421
K. BELGIAN SCENARIO
If the I Belgian Corps is able to establish itself in position, it will
develop an area defense. However, the I Belgian Corps has the oldest and
least-effective equipment of all NATO units in the Central Region.
The Warsaw Pact's offensive tactics are well suited for attacking an
area defense. In particular, the Warsaw Pact will have an easier problem
here because the Belgian defense is backed by aging equipment. Also, the
Warsaw Pact will be able to use advantages such as selecting the most
vulnerable point in the Belgian defenses and the use of their superior
equipment. The Warsaw Pact will attack by fixing the I Belgian Corps in
position, mass at the selected breakthrough point, and force a penetra-
tion. The first echelon divisions would break the Belgian defenses and
the second echelon divisions would drive into the depths of the Belgian
corps. The I Belgian Corps will inflict losses on the attacker, but their
area defense will be vulnerable to attrition. With the attrition of the
defender, if the war does not end quickly, the Belgian's area defense will
eventually fail. This failure may be expedited if the Warsaw Pact selects
the I Belgian Corps as the location of one of its main efforts.
The boundary coordination issues for the I Belgian Corps will be dif-
ficult if adjacent corps are using divergent warfighting doctrines. The
I Belgian Corps is not the strongest NATO corps, and this fact alone will
make it vulnerable for selection as a Warsaw Pact breakthrough point. If
the I Belgian Corps is unable to maintain a forward line and is forced to
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withdraw, the flanks of adjacent corps may become vulnerable for War-
saw Pact exploitation.
The I Belgian Corps plans to establish platoon and company fighting
positions, in depth, with overlapping fields of fire. The I Belgian Corps
will require reinforcements from its homeland before it is prepared to
conduct an area defense in depth.
L. THE NETHERLANDS ARMY (I NETHERLANDS CORPS)
The Netherlands has a population of 14 million people and supports
an armed forces of 103,000. [Ref. 36:p. 2691 The I Netherlands Corps is
the northernmost corps in NATO's center sector. Confronting the Dutch
corps are forces from the Soviet Second Guards Tank Army. In West
Germany, the I Netherlands Corps maintains only one armored brigade.
The Dutch active army consists of six brigades. Of these six brigades, two
are armored and four are mechanized infantry. The Netherland's reserves
consist of four brigades. These four brigades are composed of one
armored brigade, two mechanized infantry brigades, and one infantry
brigade. [Ref. 9:p. 46]
The maldeployment of the I Netherlands Corps has similar deploy-
ment problems as I Belgian Corps. If both corps are to have a chance of
reaching their positions along NATO's forward defenses, the Dutch and
Belgian corps will require early warning of a Warsaw Pact invasion. This
is based on the assumption that the longer the distance a military unit
must travel, by roadmarch, the longer it will take to arrive at its destina-
tion. Units of the I Netherlands Corps stationed in their homeland will
have to travel close to 175 kilometers to reach their initial positions.
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Dutch equipment is generally modem. The Dutch main battle tanks
are being upgraded to the Leopard 11. Older armored vehicles are being
replaced and money for training is at acceptable levels. [Ref. 9:p. 46
The I Netherlands Corps plans to fight an area defense based on
strongpoints supported by heavy concentrations of artillery fire. A former
Dutch Chief of Staff described his nation's doctrine as a "...mobile,
offensive-minded form of defense." [Ref. 41: p. 181 An armor-heavy coun-
terattack force is planned to be composed of follow-on units deploying
from the Netherlands. [Ref. 19:p. 1421
M. DUTCH SCENARIO
The I Netherlands Corps will establish an area defense with generally
modem equipment. If time permits, the Dutch will prepare their defenses
in-depth. Like the other NATO corps, Dutch boundary units must coor-
dinate with adjacent corps to avoid the problem of one national corps
withdrawing too early or too late and consequently exposing the flank of
a neighboring corps.
The Soviet doctrine is best suited to attack an area form of defense.
The Warsaw Pact in attacking the I Netherlands Corps will follow tactics
which are similar to the doctrine previously described for use against the
British and Belgian corps.
The I Netherlands Corps plans to conduct an area defense in depth.
The I Netherlands Corps will require reinforcement from their homeland
before they are prepared to defend their sector. The bulk of Dutch forces
are held in unmobilized reserve units.
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N. GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE CORPS OF THE LOW
COUNTRIES
The NATO commanders of the Dutch and Belgian Corps must face
two major questions:
1. How long will it take to move these two corps into their assigned
sectors?
2. How long will NATO actually have before the Warsaw Pact crosses
the West German border? [Ref. 36:p. 2661
Of the Dutch and Belgian Corps, the maldeployment of the I Nether-
lands Corps is the most worrisome for NATO [Ref. 36:p. 268]. In the
I Belgian Corps, at least half of its units are "in place" in West Germany.
In contrast, the single forward brigade of the I Netherlands Corps is the
only unit "in place" in West Germany. Almost totally alone, this one
Dutch brigade must cover the entire corps sector until Dutch units arrive
from their homeland. The average distance a Dutch unit must travel to
reach its forward position is nearly 175 kilometers.
The Dutch and Belgian governments' directive to mobilize and deploy
units to West Germany will be a difficult political decision. Even assum-
ing an early political decision to mobilize, the time required to prepare
the I Netherlands and I Belgian Corps will be long. There are many time-
consuming military tasks which must be performed before these corps
arrive as fully operational units for use by the NORTHAG commander.
For example, executing the Belgian and Dutch movement to their corps
sectors will be a major pacing factor in NATO's development of its for-
ward defenses [Ref. 36:pp. 267-268). Furthermore, pushing the Dutch
and Belgian units against the possible tide of civilian traffic and across
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the paths of NATO's lines of communications has the potential to be
chaotic. Finally, there is concern among NATO leaders that the Warsaw
Pact might reach the Dutch and Belgian battle positions before the
assigned Dutch and Belgian units. NATO commanders must confront
these facts when they weigh the operational roles that the Belgian or
Dutch Corps may or may not perform. [Ref. 36: pp. 283-284].
A superior enemy usually attacks weakest points, while containing
and then outflanking strong points along a front. This lack of
strength and capability on the ground early enough is an undeniable
problem for NATO in the Belgians Corps' area: it is even more of a
problem in the Dutch Corps' area.... [Ref. 33:p. 2681
0. COMMENTS ON THE DIVERSITY OF NATIONAL DOCTRINES
The national warfighting doctrines in NATO's center sector vary in
form. These national doctrines stress different principles at the expense
of others. Among the five nations examined are three different "forms" of
defense. Figure 11 represents the different forms of doctrine [Ref. 19:p.
1441. In NORTHAG, the British, Dutch, and Belgian Corps plan to use an
area-type defense. The three German Corps, which are intermixed in
NORTHAG and CENTAG, plan to execute a mobile-type defense. Finally,
the two U.S. Corps are moving towards an aggressive defense doctrine.
The contribution of the three "forms" of defensive operations to the over-
all impression of Warsaw Pact deterrence is open to debate. [Ref. 19:p.
1431
An argument could be made that the two US corps in pursuing their
own doctrine, independent of other adjacent corps, would present
the Soviets with a unique opportunity to achieve their desired break-
through. An enemy attack at the corps boundary between two corps
conducting totally different types of defensive operations could afford
them the best opportunity of effecting a penetration. [Ref. 42:p. 13]
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Figure 11I. Operational Doctrines of the Central Region
There are implications for a coalition which has its members (who
are fighting next to one another) using diverse warfighting doctrines. The
first major Implication of divergent doctrines is closely tied to NATO's first
function of deterrence. As defined in Chapter 11, deterrence is a
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combination of tangible "forces," the "will" to use these forces, and the
"perception" of these forces by an opponent. NATO does not possess a
common operational doctrine. In particular, it has nothing to compare
with the extensively researched body of knowledge that is called the
"Soviet Military Art." In place of the Warsaw Pact's common doctrine,
NATO has a handful of simple guiding principles and the divergent
national warfighting doctrines. The inability of NATO to form one com-
mon doctrine does not support the overall impression of deterrence. In
particular, divergent warfighting doctrines present the perception of
disharmony among a coalition. [Ref. 19:p. 1431
The second major implication of diversity in operational doctrine is
that it will allow opportunities for Warsaw Pact exploitation. The Warsaw
Pact could examine NATO's doctrinal mismatches and attack the weakest
links. [Ref. 19:p. 1451
There are some serious mismatches, particularly with the U.S., Bel-
gian, and Dutch forces. The force-strategy disjuncture is a problem
that has been with NATO since the Lisbon Conference. But if the
alliance is to rely on conventional deterrence, then a similar mis-
match at the operational level becomes just as important. [Ref. 19:p.
1451
One example of this possible mismatch between doctrine and force
structure is the U.S. Army. The U.S. V and VII Corps will conduct a ver-
sion of Airland Battle. U.S. forces are mobile and are equipped with the
necessary command and control systems to execute an aggressive
defense. However, the U.S. forces in West Germany must defend close to
250 kilometers of the IGB. U.S. forces are currently stretched to defend
this extended sector. Furthermore, the U.S. NATO forces do not have
106
large reserves or a fully developed logistical infrastructure to support a
"doctrinally correct" Airland Battle. For example, Airland Battle stresses
wide-ranging and continuous maneuver. A maneuver-based strategy will
require an equally mobile supply system which is able to move gigantic
quantities of fuel and resources to the "fast"-moving combat units. There
is some question whether the U.S. logistical system of 1990 is able to
support this fast pace of operations [Ref. 19:p. 1451. Additionally. units
in the V and VII U.S. Corps suffer from maldeployment. An example is
the U.S. 8th Mechanized Division, which must cross the Rhine River and
march over 150 kilometers to reach its forward positions.
A second example of a potential mismatch between stated doctrine
and force structure is the I Belgian Corps and the I Netherlands Corps.
Neither the Belgian nor the Dutch Corps is at full strength in either man-
power or equipment. The Dutch and Belgian corps are each planning to
conduct an area defense based on a series of fighting positions. An area/
positional type defense takes the longest time to properly prepare. The
major reason for this time factor is that the defended terrain must be
prepared by time-consuming actions such as digging bunkers, laying
minefields, and constructing obstacles. Compounding the challenges for
the I Belgian Corps and the I Netherlands Corps is the additional time-
sensitive issue of maldeployment. Because of political factors, battle posi-
tions can not be built in peacetime; given the possibly long deployment
time from their respective countries, the I Belgian Corps and I Nether-
lands Corps may not have sufficient time to develop an area/positional
defense before the arrival of the Warsaw Pact. [Ref. 19:pp. 145-1461
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A third implication of doctrinal diversity is the selection of the "best"
way to defend against a Soviet-style attack.
All other things being equal, the northern corps sectors that rely on
area-type defenses are more susceptible to penetration by a Soviet-
style multiple echelon offensive. In the Northern Army Group
(NORTHAG) area, the Warsaw Pact face three corps sectors known to
be organized into area-type defenses: British, Belgian. and Dutch
corps. Because it is easier to identify gaps and to break through a
relatively static positional defense, Warsaw Pact forces may concen-
trate their efforts against these sectors. The combination of open ter-
rain and positional defense force deployments makes the NORTHAG
front particularly vulnerable.... [Ref. 19:p. 146]
A fourth implication of doctrinal diversity is the role of reserves and
units from different nations reinforcing a threatened sector. Ground
forces from adjacent corps must be prepared to move into their neighbor-
ing corps sectors if a threat develops to the integrity of NATO defenses.
One example is the use of counterattacks. Each NATO nation plans to
use some form of counterattack as part of its warfighting doctrine. How-
ever, the Dutch concept of counterattacks in an area defense is different
than the U.S. Airland Battle concept of counterattacks, which may call
for driving "deep" into the depths of the enemy. In contrast, the Dutch
concept of a counterattack is more narrow and seeks primarily a local,
tactical-level advantage. For this reason, the coordination of issues such
as counterattacks must take place between NATO allies. Additionally,
each national doctrine may specify a different "pace" of withdrawal. A
corps fighting an area defense in depth, from strongpoints, may withdraw
at a different rate than a corps conducting a mobile defense. Avoiding the
possibility of exposing the flanks of a friendly unit that an uneven with-
drawal may create in NATO's forward defenses will be difficult under
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Warsaw Pact pressure [Ref. 19:p. 1461. Overall, the mixing of various
units, from diverse corps, who fight in different ways, will be a command
and control challenge for the NATO commanders.
Doctrinal differences exist among NATO allies, and these differences
will persist. One of the paramount tasks of the SACEUR is to work to
harmonize alliance capabilities: doctrine, force structure, planning,
logistics, and so forth. Although significant progress has been
achieved in the post-Vietnam period, these efforts will continue to be
frustrated by limitations inherent in the diversities of coalition war-
fare. [Ref. 19 :p. 147]
NATO's two functions are to deter an invasion and to fight the War-
saw Pact if deterrence fails. If the Warsaw Pact does invade western
Europe, it will be critical for NATO to develop the "rules" of its defense
before the arrival of Soviet tanks. When the chaos of war sets in, it will be
virtually impossible to quickly develop a consensus of NATO-level opera-
tional procedures in time to stop the attacker's momentum. A coalition
which desires to create the impression of deterrence must face the reality




This thesis has examined the warfighting doctrines of NATO's five
national armies which are deployed in central Europe against the
Warsaw Pact. The approach for this chapter is to summarize key tenets
from the first six chapters. FInally, comments are presented concerning
possible solutions regarding the implications for NATO of each member's
military fighting with diverse warfighting doctrines.
NATO is a political and military organization and it was not formed
to fight a future European war. Instead, NATO's primary goal is to deter
aggression. Deterrence is a political objective. NATO is a political organi-
zation first and a warfighting organization second. In some situations,
NATO's solution to a peacetime political issue initiates or compounds a
wartime problem. One example is NATO's "layer cake" corps defense. The
layer-cake defense demonstrates political solidarity but it simultaneously
increases interoperability friction between NATO military units and com-
mand structures.
The Western Alliance is fundamentally defensive and it is a coalition
in which one superpower does not dictate policy to the other members. A
result of this democratic structure is that extensive consultation occurs
between NATO members. NATO decision making is completed only after
all 16 NATO members agree on what should be the collective decision.
For example, before a common coalition warfighting doctrine is adopted
by NATO, all individual members must accept this common doctrine.
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Each NATO member has its own unique military organization, history,
and idea on how best to fight an enemy. Additionally, a coalition's doc-
trine has the political objective of avoiding disunity and controversy. Alli-
ance leaders are faced with the dilemma of selecting a common warfight-
ing doctrine which would be cohesive for the coalition and acceptable to
all 16 NATO members.
In contrast to the NATO decision-making process, the Warsaw Pact,
under the domination of the Soviet Union. controls most of the military
planning for its Warsaw Pact allies. One result of the Soviet Union's lead-
ership is that the Warsaw Pact has adopted Soviet military doctrine and
organization. If the Warsaw Pact attacks NATO, the Warsaw Pact will
have an advantage because each of its members uses a similar warfight-
ing doctrine. Additionally, Soviet military thinking is primarily offensive
in nature. Soviet doctrine calls for massing superior forces at the desig-
nated breakthrough point(s). Furthermore, Soviet doctrine seeks to
attack an opposition's vulnerabilities. Soviet doctrine exploits these vul-
nerabilities through the use of surprise, combined-arms offensive action,
and momentum.
The defense of western Europe is a joint operation. NATO must
approach this Joint operation from two levels. The first level is a national
perspective. The Western Alliance must insure that each NATO member
integrates its air, land, and naval assets into one coherent national force.
The second level is a coalition perspective. NATO must attempt to inte-
grate each member's armed forces into one effective coalition military
force. The task confronting NATO is formidable. The Western Alliance
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must effectively integrate the air, land, and naval forces from 16 nations,
each with a different warfighting doctrine, into one unified structure.
The Western Alliance's lack of one unifying coalition warfighting
doctrine hinders the integration of the armed forces of member nations
into one NATO structure. NATO's warfighting doctrine has evolved over
40 years into a concept which is vague. This ambiguity is only com-
pounded by the diversity in national warfighting doctrines. However,
NATO attempts to create a unified framework. NATO doctrine, as seen in
sources such as MC 14/3 and ATP 35 A, does specify broad principles
such as forward defense, the definition of common terms, and sections of
the battlefield. Unfortunately, these documents do not clearly state a spe-
cific warfighting doctrine. One example of the vague NATO doctrine is
shown in ATP 35 A. This publication develops points such as dividing the
battlefield into sectors, but within these sectors allows each ally the abil-
ity to establish its own concept of how to defend that sector.
When NATO allows its national corps such a wide latitude in how
they fight, a great responsibility is placed on these national corps.
NATO's "hands off' approach to controlling its corps implies that success
for the Western Alliance means that all eight national corps must indi-
vidually defeat their Warsaw Pact attacks. However, a penetration in one
national corps sector has the potential to unhinge the entire NATO for-
ward defense.
The boundaries between all military units are vulnerable to exploita-
tion. Additionally, the Warsaw Pact, as the offensive force, has the ability
to select the time and location of its assault. The Warsaw Pact will take
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advantage of this opportunity. If the Western Alliance is to have a greater
chance of absorbing the initial Warsaw Pact assault, NATO's national
corps must conduct boundary coordination as they recoil from an attack.
If proper boundary coordination is not achieved, the chance for penetra-
tion of NATO's forward defenses by the Warsaw Pact will be quite large.
For the greatest probability of success, NATO's corps commanders
must coordinate and synchronize their actions across shared boundaries.
Synchronization is the commanders' most important task. When the
commander is not physically present to influence his subordinates, he
must use an indirect means such as a common doctrine or procedure to
help achieve synchronization. Additionally, if a military operation is
properly synchronized, the potential power of single units is increased
beyond their individual effects. However, synchronization in NATO is
complicated when adjacent units may speak a different language, have
varying organizational structures, or have an entirely different concept of
how to fight. In this thesis, the importance of coordination and synchron-
ization has been demonstrated by two examples. One example was the
success of General George Patton's Third Army during the Battle of the
Bulge. The second example was the development of boundary coordina-
tion issues in the Fulda Gap between the U.S. V Corps and the West
German II Corps.
NATO's eight national corps maintain a forward defense against the
Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact has one unifying doctrine and the ability
to select the time and location of its attack. NATO does not have a com-
mon warfighting doctrine. This lack of a coalition doctrine makes NATO
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corps boundaries increasingly vulnerable, does not reinforce the percep-
tion of deterrence, and allows opportunities for exploitation by the War-
saw Pact.
The warfighting doctrines of the U.S., West German, Belgian, British,
and Dutch corps are not fully compatible. Each national corps employs a
doctrine which is based on a variant of one of four operational forms of
defense. These four operational forms are area defense, linear defense,
mobile defense, and aggressive defense. An area defense is structured to
use a battlefield's depth. The defender's objective is to draw the attacker
into a series of defensive belts and defeat him V-t cugh attrition or coun-
terattacks. A linear defense is when the defender constructs a strong
barrier and attempts to keep the attacker from penetrating this barrier.
The defender wants the attacker to suffer heavy losses by assaulting his
fortified position(s). The mobile defense is designed to stop an armor-
heavy attack. A mobile defense divides the battlefield into three zones,
each with a specific purpose. The attacker advances into the mobile
defense structure and becomes increasingly weakened and vulnerable to
counterattacks. The military which employs an aggressive defense
desires to seize the initiative early and believes that the best defense is a
potent .,iense.
The United States adheres to a doctrine based on an aggressive
defense, the West Germans a mobile defense, and the Dutch, British, and
Belgian corps follow a modification to an area defense doctrine. The
national warfighting doctrines of these five nations vary in form. When
these five armies selected the warfighting doctrine to protect their
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assigned sectors, each nation was constrained by factors such as the
equipment available, political restrictions, social issues, current military
organization, history, military traditions, economic factors, location of the
nation, geography of its assigned defensive zone, and many other factors.
One result of each NATO member basing its doctrine on such a
series of internal and external factors is that the nation is not entirely
free to select the best military solution. Instead, these factors might force
a nation to chose a warfighting doctrine which might not be similar to
other NATO members.
The internal and external factors which affect a warfighting doctrine
are difficult to change. NATO desires to have each member equipped with
the most modern weapons available. However, the nations of the Western
Alliance cannot afford the gigantic price of supplying all its units with the
most modern equipment. For example, the I Belgian Corps would like to
purchase new armored vehicles to replace its aging Leopard Is, but it
does not have the funds to procure the latest and most effective tanks.
The Belgian government must accept the fact that it does not have the
financial resources or the public support to construct the most modern
military possible. This low level of funding directly affects the warfighting
doctrine which is used by the I Belgian Corps. In other words, if the I
Belgian Corps does not have expensive, highly mobile weapons, it cannot
employ a defensive doctrine such as an aggressive defense, which is
based on highly mobile weapons.
The impact of history is another example of how external and inter-
nal factors influence the selection of a national warfighting doctrine. The
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modem German army looks to its past for guidance on how to defend the
Central Region against the Warsaw Pact. During World War II, the Ger-
man army employed the highly successful mobile defense. The German
army of today draws from these World War II lessons in its development
of a warfighting doctrine. The current German mobile defense warfighting
doctrine was shaped by events which took place in German history.
The differences between the warfighting doctrines of the national
corps in NATO's Central Region are striking. These differences are a
result of unique internal and external factors which affect how a nation
selects its warfighting doctrine.
NATO's use of diverse national warfighting doctrines has four impli-
cations:
1. Doctrinal diversity creates the impression of coalition disharmony
and, consequently, does not contribute to the concept of deterrence
as viewed from the perspective of the Warsaw Pact.
2. NATO's divergence in warfighting doctrines might present opportun-
ities for exploitation by the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact's war-
fighting doctrine seeks to attack enemy weaknesses, such as
boundaries between NATO's national units.
3. An area form of defense is used by three of the five national corps.
However, an area form of defense might not be the best way to
defend against a Soviet-style assault. For example, a military unit
which executes a positional/area defense might become more easily
fixed in place and either isolated or destroyed.
4. Diverse warfighting doctrines must be coordinated between national
corps. This doctrinal diversity creates a larger coordination problem
for a coalition's command and control structure, as compared to a
coalition with a common doctrine. The Western Alliance's efforts to
achieve harmony among its members, who possess entirely different
concepts on how to fight, is a major coordination challenge for
NATO.
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How can effective coordination be achieved by the members of
NATO? Possible solutions may be reached by refocusing on the concept
that doctrinal diversity between national corps is a coordination problem.
A coordination problem may be solved by using means such as improving
an organization's coordination mechanisms.
NATO's goals are to create the Impression of deterrence and, if this
fails, fight the Warsaw Pact. NATO's preparations for obtaining these two
goals would be enhanced if the national corps, which are major compo-
nents of deterrence and warfighting, learn to more effectively train and,
consequently, fight together. NATO's ability to have its corps train
together will be improved if its multi-national units are properly
coordinated.
Six coordination mechanisms have been described in Chapter V:
direct supervision, mutual adjustment, and the standardization of skills,
processes, outputs, and norms. These six coordination mechanisms are
used as a framework for suggestions on how to more effectively coordi-
nate NATO's national corps. The ultimate goal of these suggestions is to
reduce the interoperability friction between NATO's corps.
Direct supervision is the first mechanism for coordination. Direct
supervision is when coordination is accomplished through personal
intervention by a supervisor or leader. Direct supervision will be
enhanced after two points have been understood by the NATO alliance:
1. Alliance members must realize that the NATO corps defense should
be viewed as a whole instead of eight separate corps battles by five
individual nations.
117
2. The current NATO army group commander and his staff do not have
the resources to fully influence the battle in the army groups sector.
When NATO selected the "type" of headquarters to place between the
national corps and AFCENT, it picked the smaller army group instead of
the field army headquarters. NATO's current army group is not a power-
ful headquarters. The army group is normally an organization without
organic combat support units or sizeable reserves. The army group was
selected partially based on the limited authority that the members of
NATO wanted to give this NATO-controlled level of command. A second
reason for the selection of the army group was limited resources. Without
a reorganization at the national corps level, NATO does not have "extra"
military units available to form a large army group reserve. NATO's lim-
ited resources are generally placed forward in the national corps and not
held by the army group.
The ability of the army group to assist its separate corps must be
strengthened. A NATO army group commander and his headquarters
should be given increased power to control the multi-corps sector.
Increased power, for this level of command, is coupled with an improve-
ment in the commander's C3 structure, which includes improved com-
munication facilities. Additionally, more thought should be given to
improving the operational doctrine and procedures which support the
army group as it assumes an increased role as a link between the stra-
tegic and tactical levels of war. Also, the increased influence of the army
group includes the ability to allocate resources and military units across
national corps boundaries. By allowing the army group commander
greater control over his subordinate corps, the army group commander
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could more quickly effect his multi-corps battle and utilize his limited
resources.
The army group commander's increased influence allows him to
react more effectively to the dynamic battlefield. For example, if the War-
saw Pact attacks a corps boundary, the army group commander with
increased resources and control would be better able to react to this
time-sensitive threat. The strengthened army group commander could
coordinate the boundary between his two threatened corps, each with a
possibly diverse doctrine, and more efficiently close the penetration.
Mutual adjustment is the second coordination mechanism. Mutual
adjustment is where two or more units confer to reach a shared solution.
Mutual adjustment is not usually the fastest form of coordination. Addi-
tionally, in using mutual adjustment, one member tries not to dominate
the other party.
Mutual adjustment can be used to strengthen coordination between
corps using diverse warfighting doctrines. For example, mutual adjust-
ment might be improved by developing a NATO officer corps with a
greater "alliance perspective." In other words, the Western Alliance
should attempt to educate its officers and civilian leaders to appreciate
the coalition aspect of a problem as well as their own national perspec-
tives. This goal may be reached by increased education in NATO schools
and multi-national training. Additionally, mutual adjustment may be
realized if national units actually cross national boundaries and practice
in peacetime what might have to take place in wartime.
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Standardization of skills is the third mechanism for coordination.
The goal of standardization of skills is to make individuals and units as
interchangeable as possible. This might be accomplished by having these
individuals or units train to one common standard or in a similar train-
ing environment. A training program which stresses concepts such as
crossing national corps boundaries would assist in making units more
interchangeable. Additionally, the standardization of skills would be
improved by sending officers and civilian leaders to common NATO
schools or by increasing partnership/exchange arrangements between
multi-national units.
The standardization of processes and outputs is the next means of
coordination. These two coordination procedures are accomplished by
means such as standard operating procedures. The standardization of
processes and outputs allows military operations to take place with a
reduced planning and direct supervision. For example, standard operat-
ing procedures are developed which instruct a unit in how to act in spe-
cific situations. The standardization of process and outputs allows coor-
dination to take place between national units based on shared
expectations.
The coordination problems caused by diverse national warfighting
doctrines would be reduced by having one coalition warfighting doctrine.
A common NATO doctrine would state how each national corps would
fight in coordination with the other members of NATO. A common coali-
tion warfighting doctrine or the increased use of NATO standards and
procedures could assist in the standardization of processes and outputs.
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Unfortunately, the solution of a common warfighting doctrine, which
appears obvious, would encounter many problems. NATO is a democratic
coalition and unity is important to such an organization. Sixteen demo-
cratic nations can not be coerced to accept a common doctrine. Addi-
tionally, each member has an unique military system with varying force
structures and equipment. The cost of changing each member's armed
forces to effectively use a common coalition warfighting doctrine would be
prohibitive. Additionally, what common doctrine should be selected by
NATO? For example, a resource-poor Belgian corps, with aging equip-
ment, is not as able to execute deep counterattacks into the enemy's rear
areas as a country with more mobile equipment. However, deep counter-
attacks by Belgian units might be called for if it follows an aggressive
defense doctrine. On the other hand, the advantages gained by the highly
mobile and modem equipment of the U.S. and West German corps would
be wasted if these weapons systems where immobilized in a positional/
area defense.
In light of these difficulties in achieving a common coalition war-
fighting doctrine, another approach might be used. NATO's leadership
could stress to its members the advantages of a "common" approach and
develop appropriate procedures to account for doctrinal diversity. The
increased use of standard coalition procedures, combined with realistic
training, would assist in coalition coordination. For example, Belgian or
Dutch units might be reinforced by U.S. armored counterattack forces.
Standard procedures could be developed in peacetime for the utilization
of these U.S. forces by the Belgian or Dutch commander. These proce-
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dures could be developed to account for the coordination problems
resulting from doctrinal diversity.
The standardization of process and outputs might also extend to the
coordination of logistical resources. NATO might modify its logistical
structure to alow multi-national units to be more interchangeable. This
modification might be difficult if it encounters resistance from sources
such as national defense contractors. However, it is possible to redesign
the logistical infrastructure to more effectively support the cross-
attachment of multi-national units. For example, an increased emphasis
on common parts, logistical procedures, supply lines and military sup-
plies would assist in the standardization of processes and outputs. A
common NATO logistical structure would more easily allow the shifting of
units across corps boundaries and, consequently, contribute to making
these units more interchangeable.
The sixth mechanism for coordination is achieved by the standard-
ization of norms. If a national military feels that it is fighting as part of a
larger coalition or for a greater purpose, that national unit should be
more cohesive. In other words, if all members of an organization under-
stand their place in the larger situation, instead of as isolated national
units fighting in a foreign land, the individual members might fight
harder. The standardization of norms might be achieved by multi-
national training and an educational program all the way down to the
individual soldier. This low-level educational program would assist the
soldier in identifying with NATO as well as with his individual nation.
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Cost is a major factor for any financially constrained organization.
The proposed solutions to the coordination problems caused by diverse
warfighting doctrines are generally low in cost. If a coalition had unlim-
ited assets, it could buy common equipment, develop multi-layered com-
munications nets, and have extensive resources available for training.
However, NATO does not have unlimited resources. For example, one of
the solutions recommended to solve the coordination problem is to create
a coalition perspective through viewing the defense of the Central Region
as a whole and not as separate corps battles. This solution might be real-
ized by a change in the command philosophy of key military leaders. The
dollar cost of this change in attitudes by key military leaders/mentors is
not great. This solution is combined with having NATO units actually
practice performing acts such as crossing national corps boundaries. The
more long-term solutions, such as a common logistical structure and
doctrine, have the potential to be more expensive. Goals such as a com-
mon logistical base may eventually be obtained through firm alliance
leadership and the education of NATO members that it is in their best
interest to seek a coalition solution.
NATO's primary goal is deterrence. If deterrence fails, NATO must
fight the Warsaw Pact and attempt to restore the territory of its members.
War is a violent and confusing situation. If the Warsaw Pact does invade
western Europe, it will be critical for NATO to develop the rules of its
defense before the arrival of Warsaw Pact tanks and the chaos of urdr. A
coalition which wishes to create the impression of deterrence must face
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the reality of its diverse warfighting doctrines and seek solutions to the
issues raised by this diversity.
The purpose of this thesis has been to analyze the warfighting doc-
trines of the national armies in NATO's Central Region. The warfighting
doctrines of each national army are not fully compatible. Additionally,
creating a common coalition doctrine is not the most practical solution.
However, if the Western Alliance enhances the six coordination mecha-
nisms between NATO's multi-national units, the end result will be an





1. NATO Defense Planning Committee, Enhancing Alliance Collective
Security, Shared Roles, Risks and Responsibilities in the Alliance,
Brussels, Belgium, December 1988.
2. Reed, John A., Germany and NATO, National Defense University
Press, Washington, DC, 1987.
3. Collins, John M., American and Soviet Military Trends Since the
Cuban Missile Crisis, The Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 1978.
4. The Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 1985, The Situation
and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces, Bonn, West
Germany, 1985.
5. Sovereign, Michael G., "NATO History and NATO Organization,"
Monterey, CA, 1990 (lecture presented at the Naval Postgraduate
School).
6. Myers, Kenneth A., NATO the Next Thirty Years, Westview Press,
Boulder, CO, 1980.
7. Sovereign, Michael G., "NATO Organization," Monterey, CA, 1990
(handouts presented during lecture at the Naval Postgraduate
School).
8. General Accounting Office, Relationships Between U.S. and NATO
Military Structures-Need for Closer Integration, Washington, DC,
1977.
9. Kellebrew, Robert B., Conventional Defense and Total Deterrence,
Assessing NATO's Strategic Options, Scholarly Resources, Inc.,
Wilmington, Delaware, 1986.
10. Faringdon, Hugh, Confrontation, The Strategic Geography of NATO
and the Warsaw Pact, Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York City,
NY, 1986.
11. Congress of the Unites States, U.S. Ground Forces, Design and Cost
Alternatives for NATO and Non-European Contingencies, Congres-
sional Budget Office, Washington, DC, December 1980.
125
12. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, Prospects for
Change, Washington, DC, 1989.
13. National War College, Strategic and Doctrinal Implications of Deep
Attack Concepts for the Defense of Central Europe, by John R.
Landry and others, National War College, Washington, DC, 1983.
14. Goodpaster, Andrew J., and others, Strengthening Conventional
Deterrence in Europe, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1985.
15. Air Command and Staff College, Strategy Comparison: Warsaw Pact
and NATO, by Ronald E. Daniel, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 1985.
16. Bonds, Raymond, and others, Russian Military, Power, Bonanza
Books, New York City, NY, 1982.
17. United States Army, Soviet Army Operations and Tactics, Field
Manual 100-2-1, Washington, DC, July 1984.
18. Casey, Patrick W., An Invisible Tower of Babel: NATO's Informal
Operational Art and What it Means to the US Army in Europe, Mas-
ter's Thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and
General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 1983.
19. Golden, James R., Clark, Asa A., and Arlinghaus, Bruce E., Con-
ventional Deterrence, Lexington Books, Lexington, MS, 1984.
20. Office of the Secretary of Defense (Net Assessment), Problems of
Command and Control in a Major European War, Analytical Assess-
ments Corporation, Washington, DC, December 1983.
21. United States Army, Operations, Field Manual 100-5, Washington,
DC, 20 August 1982.
22. Air Command and Staff College, NATO's Military Strategy and
Forces, by John Christensen, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, April
1988.
23. United States Congress, NATO-Warsaw Pact, Conventional Force
Balance, General Accounting Office, Washington, DC, December
1988.
24. United States Congress, New Technology for NATO, Implementing
Follow-On Forces Attack, Office of Technology Assessment,
Washington, DC, June 1987.
25. United States Army, Corps Operations, Field Manual 100-15,
Washington, DC, 21 February 1985.
126
26. Bethman, Ronald, and Malloy, Karen, Command and Control: An
Introduction, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Mon-
terey, CA, March 1989.
27. Flynn, Gregory, Soviet Military Doctrine and Western Policy, Rout-
ledge, New York City, NY, 1989.
28. Janes, William H., Operational Art In NATO How Will Politically
Motivated Restrictions Affect Operational Maneuver, Master's The-
sis, School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 1983.
29. Air Command and Staff College, Airland Battle Doctrine: The
Debate Continues, by William Hatch, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL,
1985.
30. Komer, Robert, Need for a Coalition Strategy and Posture, National
Security Issues Symposium 1983, Washington, DC, October 1983.
31. The International Institute Strategic Studies, Power and Policy:
Doctrine, the Alliance and Arms Control, Adelphi Papers #207, The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Spring
1986.
32. Young, Peter, Strategy and Tactics of the Great Generals and Their
Battles, Bison Books, Greenwich, CT, 1984.
33. Jones, Carl R., "Organizational Macro-Structure," Monterey, CA,
March 1989 (lecture presented at the Naval Postgraduate School).
34. Sovereign, Michael G., "NATO C3 Issues and Problems," Mon-
terey, CA, 1990 (lecture presented at the Naval Postgraduate
School).
35. Fisher, Robert L., Defending the Central Front: The Balance of
Forces, Adelphi Papers #127, The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, London, 1986.
36. Gann, Lewis H., The Defense of Western Europe, Auburn House
Publishing Company, Dover, MS, 1987.
37. Goldstein, Walter, Fighting Allies, Tensions Within the Atlantic Alli-
ance, Brassey's Defense Publishers, London, 1985.
38. Shapley, Deborah, "'The Army's New Fighting Doctrine," The New
York Times Magazine, New York City, NY, November 28, 1982.
127
39. Gabriel, Richard A., Fighting Armies, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, A
Combat Assessment, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1983.
40. Bowie, Robert R., Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in
Europe, St. Martin's Press, New York City, NY, 1983.
41. Naval War College, Should the U.S. Army's Airland Battle be
Acceptable to NATO, by John A. Van Alstyne, Newport, RI, 1986.
42. Naval War College, Airland Battle: Can it be Implemented Within




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145




C3 Academic Group, Code CC
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
4. CPT Kenneth P. Dzierzanowski 3
5720 Grillet Place (SW)
Fort Myers, FL 33919
5. Professor Michael G. Sovereign, Code OR/SM
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
6. LTC William Caldwell, Code OR/SM
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
129
